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From the Director . . .
The Center for Business and Economic Research
is proud to publish the 24th Kentucky Annual
Economic Report.  The Annual Report is one of the
important ways in which the Center fulfills its mission
to monitor and analyze the economy of Kentucky.
The 1996 Report contains seven articles that provide
forecasts and address many of  the major economic
policy issues facing Kentuckians today.
Again this year we draw upon the expertise of the
faculty at the University of Kentucky.  All seven
articles are either authored or coauthored by
University of Kentucky economists.  As the Center
has become fully integrated into the University’s
Department of Economics, more faculty have become
involved in the Center’s activities.  In fact, we have
five new authors in the Report, four of whom are
faculty at the University of Kentucky.  We are
especially proud that Dr. Gail Hoyt and Dr. Robert
Gillette, the two faculty teaching specialists in the
Department of Economics, are contributing to this
report and sharing with us some of their other
scholarly abilities.
In the lead article we unveil the University of
Kentucky State Econometric Model.  Since I became
Director of the Center almost two years ago, we have
worked toward increasing our ability to forecast the
state economy and its components.  This effort
accelerated when we hired Dr. Eric Thompson, a
regional economist with a Ph.D. from the University
of Wisconsin.  Through Dr. Thompson’s work CBER
now has the capability to provide detailed quarterly
forecasts of the state economy.  He forecasts that
Kentucky Gross State Product will grow by 2.8
percent in 1996.  He also provides forecasts for 1997
and 1998 and disaggregated industry breakdowns of
the results of our new state forecasting model.
The second article is a national economic review
and outlook by Dr. Gillette.  At the national level, he
finds that in 1995 the economy coasted to a “soft
landing,” and he forecasts 2.5 percent growth in
Gross Domestic Product in 1996.
The remaining articles deal with economic policy
issues facing the state today.  Dr. Gail Hoyt and
Melissa Lamb analyze the prospects for welfare
reform in Kentucky.  They discuss previous and
potential reforms and the role of block grants.  They
also estimate the savings from capping the amount of
time a person would be eligible for AFDC.
Drs. Stephan Goetz and David Debertin examine
the early evidence on the economic effects of KERA.
They find that before the passage of KERA, revenues
per pupil were negatively related to the poverty rate
but that the reverse was true by 1993-4.  They also
estimate managerial efficiency by school district.
Dr. Dan Black and Amitabh Chandra study the
effect of economic development incentives offered by
the state on economic activity.  They find that
Industrial Revenue Bonds have a permanent positive
effect on the earnings in the counties that receive
them.
As the federal government moves toward the use
of block grants to the states, it is important to know
how different parts of the state may be affected.  Drs.
William Hoyt and Frank Scott undertake a county-by-
county analysis of the receipt of federal transfer
income and how it might change with the advent of
block grants.  They find that the distribution of
payments by county would change significantly under
several block grant distribution schemes.
Finally, my article examines how the wages paid
to Kentuckians changed between 1988 and 1994 and
compares the Kentucky and overall U. S. wage
structure.  Some of the most important changes were
that the returns to schooling increased in Kentucky,
the premium paid to workers in manufacturing
increased, and the gender wage gap narrowed
between 1988 and 1994.
The last year has been an exciting one at the
Center for Business and Economic Research.  We
have moved from the Mathews Building to Suite 348
in the Business and Economics Building.  This
location makes it easier for us to interact with the
faculty in the Department of Economics and the rest
of the College of Business and Economics.  In
addition to Eric Thompson, we have hired a number
of graduate and undergraduate research assistants and
have research contracts with several clients in local,
state, and federal government, and the private sector.
We look forward to an even more exciting 1996.
During the first half of 1996, I will be a Visiting
Professor at the Economics University of Vienna,
Austria.  I will be pursuing new research projects
while there and continuing work on Center projects.
Dr. Dan Black will serve ably as Acting Director of
the Center in my absence.
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The Center for Business and Economic Research
(CBER) is the applied economic research branch of
the College of Business and Economics at the
University of Kentucky.  Its purpose is to disseminate
economic information and provide economic and
policy analysis to assist decision makers in
Kentucky’s public and private sectors.  In addition,
the Center performs research projects for federal,
state, and local government agencies, as well as for
private-sector clients nationwide.  The primary
motivation behind CBER’s research agenda is the
belief that systematic and scientific inquiries into
economic phenomena yield knowledge which is
indispensable to the formulation of informed public
policy.
Recent studies completed by CBER focus on the
areas of manpower, labor, and human resources;
health economics; public finance; and economic
growth and development.  In addition to the Kentucky
Annual Economic Report, CBER publishes Review
and Perspective, an occasional publication with
descriptive and analytical articles on the Kentucky
economy.  It also publishes the College of Business
and Economics Working Papers, which report the
results of current research by college faculty, and
Growth and Change, a scholarly, refereed journal
with international distribution.
Contributing Authors
Dr. Mark C. Berger, Director of the Center for Business and Economic Research since 1994, is a Professor of
Economics and Ashland Oil Research Fellow at the University of Kentucky.  He received a Ph.D. from The Ohio
State University in 1981, at which time he joined the faculty of the University of Kentucky.  His research interests
include unemployment insurance, health insurance reform, welfare reform, and other public policy issues.  His
papers have appeared in journals such as the American Economic Review, the Journal of Political Economy, and the
Review of Economics and Statistics.  He will be a visiting professor at the Economics University of Vienna, Austria,
during the spring 1996 semester.
Dr. Dan A. Black is a Professor of Economics and Ashland Oil Research Fellow at the University of Kentucky.  He
received his Ph.D. from Purdue University in 1983, at which time he joined the University of Kentucky.  He has also
served as Visiting Associate Professor at the University of Chicago in 1989-90.  His research interests include labor
economics and public policy.  His papers have appeared in academic journals such as the American Economic
Review, the Review of Economics and Statistics, and the Journal of Labor Economics.  He is co-author with Dr.
Mark Berger of a forthcoming book on on-the-job training from the Upjohn Institute.  Dr. Black will serve as Acting
Director of the Center for Business and Economic Research during the spring 1996 semester.
Amitabh Chandra is a Research Associate at CBER and a student in the Ph.D. program in economics at the
University of Kentucky.  In 1993 he received a Traveling Scholars grant to pursue research on the methodology of
Carl Menger in Vienna, Austria.  His research interests include the economics of higher education, poverty policy,
and the history of economic thought.
Dr. David L. Debertin is a Professor of Agricultural Economics at the University of Kentucky.  He received his
Ph.D. in 1973 from Purdue University and served on the faculty there before coming to the University of Kentucky
in 1974.  Dr. Debertin also is co-editor of the Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics.  His fields of interest
include the economics of education and rural economic development.  His research has been published in journals
such as the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, the Review of Agricultural Economics, the Journal of
Educational Finance, and the Atlantic Economic Journal.
Dr. J. Robert Gillette is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Kentucky.  He received his Ph.D.
from Texas A&M University in 1986 and joined the faculty of the University of Kentucky in 1994.  Before coming
to Kentucky, he taught at Texas A&M University and Washington State University, and worked in private
consulting.  Dr. Gillette has authored or co-authored economic studies for various public agencies, including the
Internal Revenue Service and the State of California, and for numerous private organizations.
Dr. Stephan J. Goetz is an Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics at the University of Kentucky.  He
received his Ph.D. from Michigan State University in 1990, at which time he joined the faculty of the University of
Kentucky.  His primary area of research is rural economic development, with an emphasis on the roles of education
and markets in the development process.  His research has been published in journals such as the American Journal
of Agricultural Economics, Economic Development Quarterly, and Socioeconomic Planning Sciences.
Dr. Gail Mitchell Hoyt is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Kentucky.  She received her
Ph.D. from the University of Kentucky in 1992.  She previously taught at Centre College and the University of
Richmond before joining the faculty of the University of Kentucky in 1994.  Her areas of interest include economics
education, labor economics, and industrial organization.  In 1995, she published The Worker, the Firm, and the
Decision to Use Drugs with Garland Publishing.
Dr. William H. Hoyt is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Kentucky.  In the fall of 1994, he
rejoined the faculty of the University of Kentucky after two years at Georgetown University.  He received his Ph.D.
from the University of Wisconsin in 1986 before coming to the University of Kentucky.  His areas of interest include
tax policy and public finance.  His research has been published in the American Economic Review, the Journal of
Urban Economics, and the Journal of Public Economics.  His study of the Kentucky tax system was the lead article
in the 1995 Kentucky Annual Economic Report.
Melissa D. Lamb is a free-lance writer and grant consultant.  She received a Bachelor’s degree in journalism from
the University of Kentucky in 1988.  Ms. Lamb currently serves as a marketing and grant consultant for the
Kentucky Information Resources Management Commission, the City of Louisville Mayor’s Office, and the Teen
Pregnancy Prevention Clinic of the Alliant Medical Pavilion in Louisville.  She has also worked in the Kentucky
Education, Arts and Humanities Cabinet and has been a reporter for several newspapers.
Dr. Frank A. Scott, Jr. is a Professor of Economics at the University of Kentucky.  He received his Ph.D. from the
University of Virginia in 1979.  Before coming to the University of Kentucky in 1982, he taught at Auburn
University.  His areas of research include industrial organization, regulation of business, the economics of health
insurance and pensions, and public finance.  He has published papers in academic journals such as Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, the Review of Economics and Statistics, and the Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management.
Dr. Eric C. Thompson is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics and CBER at the University of
Kentucky.  He received his Ph.D. in agricultural economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1992.  Dr.
Thompson was an Assistant Professor at the Center for Economic Research at West Virginia University and in the
Community Economic Development Division of the West Virginia University Extension Service before coming to
Kentucky in 1995.  Dr. Thompson’s research fields include local and state economic development, regional
economics, and economic forecasting.  He has published several research reports and has a paper forthcoming at the
Review of Regional Studies.
Table of Contents
Quarterly Forecasts for the Kentucky Economy, 1996-1998 1
Eric C. Thompson
“Kentucky’s economy is forecast to grow slightly faster than the national economy.  Faster growth in per
capita income, gross state product, and employment is expected for Kentucky in most quarters from 1996
to 1998.  This growth is also expected to lead to lower unemployment rates in Kentucky than the nation,
and to encourage population growth in Kentucky.”
U. S. Economy Experiences “Soft Landing” in 1995; 11
Look for More of the Same in 1996
J. Robert Gillette
“In 1995 the United States economy moved well into its fifth year of economic expansion since the last
recession ending March 1991, and experienced the much publicized ‘soft landing’. . . . In 1996, slow to
moderate growth with low inflation should occur  The forecast for real GDP centers around 2.5 percent
growth.”
Block Grants: Building Blocks for Welfare Reform in Kentucky? 15
Gail M. Hoyt and Melissa Lamb
“Although the federal proposals do address states’ increased needs during times of recession and
population growth through emergency assistance loans and grants, the level of assistance is not
comparable to additional funds available through entitlements. . .”
Local Economics Conditions and KERA 25
Stephan J. Goetz and David L. Debertin
“KERA is being implemented across districts with widely diverging socioeconomic characteristics.  As a
result, it is not surprising that the linkages between KERA reforms, test scores, and income gains are not yet
as strong as policy makers and the public might expect.”
Chasing Smokestacks: An Analysis of Economic Development Incentives 31
Dan A. Black and Amitabh Chandra
“It appears that the IRB [Industrial Revenue Bonds] incentives had a permanent impact on the earnings of
the county.”
County-Level Differences in Per Capita Transfer Income 39
William H. Hoyt and Frank A. Scott, Jr.
“Transfer payments to individuals vary significantly among counties in Kentucky.  Much of this variation is
to be expected, given the variation in household income.  Not all, however, appears attributable to
differences in the characteristics of the populations of the counties.”
The Earnings of Kentucky Workers, 1988-1994 47
Mark C. Berger
“Those persons in manufacturing jobs continued to see their earnings increase relative to those in retail
trade from 1988 to 1994. . . . The difference between female and male annual earning . . . was 25.8 percent
in 1988 and 17.2 percent in 1994.”
Quarterly Forecasts for the Kentucky Economy, 1996-1998
Kentucky Annual Economic Report, 1996 1
Quarterly Forecasts for the Kentucky
Economy, 1996-1998
Eric C. Thompson
Assistant Professor CBER and Department of Economics, University of Kentucky
Introduction
The following article describes a forecast for the
Kentucky economy produced using the University of
Kentucky State Econometric Model.  This is the first
forecast based on the model, which was developed in
1995.  The model produces quarterly forecasts with
significant sector and demographic detail.  Forecasts
are made for many mining, construction,
manufacturing, retail, and service industries and
government at a detailed level.  Population forecasts
are made by five year age groups for both men and
women.  Results are presented below for 20
manufacturing industries, two mining industries, three
service industries, and three
levels of government. 
Quarterly forecasts are
presented below for
employment and income
for 1996.  Annual forecasts
are presented for 1996,
1997, and 1998.
Compared to its rapid
growth in the first half of the
1990s, the Kentucky
economy should experience more moderate growth in
the next three years.  But, throughout the period, the
state's economy is forecast to outperform the national
economy.
Growth in the Kentucky economy is expected to
be as broad-based as it is consistent.  Not only are the
service and retail industries forecast to grow, but a
majority (15 of 20) of manufacturing industries are
expected to add employment from 1996 to 1998.  In
contrast, only five of 20 manufacturing industries
nationally are expected to add jobs.  In fact, the
forecast of faster job growth in the Kentucky economy
is primarily due to the faster growth forecast for
manufacturing and construction industries.
Faster job growth is expected to lead to wage and
salary income growth of 1.7 percent per year.  Growth
in wages, salaries, and benefits is forecast to account
for 68.9 percent of total income growth in Kentucky. 
Growth in transfer income, while rapid, will account
for 23.7 percent of income growth.
The Kentucky Forecast
The rate of growth in the Kentucky economy is
forecast to be slightly higher than national growth
(see the Appendix for a description of the national
forecast). In most quarters and years, Kentucky’s
growth is expected to exceed national growth by a
few tenths of a percent whether the measure is gross
product, employment, or per capita income.  While
this difference may seem
slight, its cumulative
impact could be
substantial. To give one
example, Kentucky’s
employment growth rate is
expected to exceed national
growth by an average of
0.2 percent annually. This
small percentage, though,
translates into an additional
9,870 jobs for Kentucky from 1996 to 1998.
Kentucky’s more rapid growth is not a function
of the types of industries located in the state because
Kentucky does not have a particularly large share of
the nation’s rapidly growing industries, such as
computer equipment or software development. 
Rather, the key to stronger growth is the faster rate of
growth in a broad group of manufacturing and
construction industries.
Recent Developments
The rate of growth in the Kentucky economy
slowed in 1995.  This slack followed a nationwide
trend as the national economy slowed in 1995 after
two years of rapid job growth in 1993 and 1994.
Despite a forecast for continued
national decline . . . job growth
is expected in nearly every
manufacturing industry in
Kentucky.
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The Kentucky economy is estimated to have
added 40,000 jobs in 1995.1  This 2.6 percent rate of
growth is strong but substantially less than the 3.3
percent rate of non-farm job growth in 1994, when
the state’s economy added 50,000 jobs.  Non-farm
employment grew by 3.0 percent in the United States
in 1994 but will have grown only at a 2.3 percent rate
in 1995.
It is worth noting that the rate of job growth in
the Kentucky economy exceeded the national job
growth rate in both 1994 and 1995.  This faster
growth was in large part due to the performance of
manufacturing industries in Kentucky. 
Manufacturing employment grew by 10,000 jobs in
Kentucky in 1994 for a growth rate of 3.3 percent. 
Nationally, manufacturing employment grew just 1.4
percent. Manufacturing employment is estimated to
have grown by 6,000 jobs, or 1.9 percent, in
Kentucky in 1995, but only by 0.4 percent nationally.
While stronger manufacturing growth is one
reason for Kentucky’s more rapid job growth,
manufacturing employment in Kentucky is subject to
the same pressures (such as productivity growth and
overseas competition) as manufacturing nationally. 
Both nationally and in Kentucky, manufacturing
employment fell in the second and third quarters of
1995.  Continued declines in manufacturing
nationally could indicate that manufacturing growth
in Kentucky will be limited in the future.
Strong growth in service employment is another
reason for rapid job growth in Kentucky.  Service
sector employment grew 3.9 percent in 1994 and 2.9
percent in 1995.  This amounted to a growth of
14,600 jobs in 1994 and an estimated growth of
11,100 jobs in 1995.
The decline in job growth in Kentucky in 1995 is
not evident for income.  Real total personal income
grew 3.6 percent in Kentucky and 3.2 percent
nationally in 1994.  Growth rates for 1995 remained
roughly the same.  Income in Kentucky is estimated
to have grown 3.2 percent in 1995 compared to an
estimate of 3.5 percent for the United States.2 
Growth rates for population in Kentucky also were
similar for the two years.  Population growth in
Kentucky trailed national growth by about 0.1 percent
in 1994 and is estimated to have trailed national
growth by 0.2 percent in 1995.
The Next Year
The forecast for 1996 calls for a faster rate of
growth in Kentucky than in the United States. 
Following the national pattern, the economy in
Kentucky should enjoy strong growth in the first
quarter of 1996 before slowing to a moderate rate of
growth for the rest of the year.  As Figure 1
illustrates, growth in gross state product, a measure of
the output of the Kentucky economy, is forecast to
reach 3.3 percent on a annual basis in the first quarter
of the year before slowing to an average growth of
2.7 percent in the second through fourth quarters.
Non-farm employment growth is forecast to be more
steady, growing at a 2.0 percent rate or above in all
but the fourth quarter. These growth rates are
expected to be sufficient to keep unemployment low;
unemployment is forecast to remain at or near 4.8
throughout the year.  Growth in gross state product
and employment is also forecast to lead to rising
incomes in 1996.  Growth in real personal income
should reach an annual growth rate of 2.4 percent in
the first quarter of the year before falling to an
increase of approximately 1.5 percent in the
remaining three quarters.
Among industries, the retail and service sectors
are forecast to account for the largest shares of
employment growth.  Growth in total employment
from the fourth quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter
of 1996 is forecast to be 35,100.  Service employment
is expected to grow by 13,000 jobs, or 37.0 percent of
total employment growth.  Retail and wholesale trade
employment should grow by 8,300 jobs, or 23.6
percent of overall growth.  Manufacturing
employment is forecast to grow by 2,700 jobs, or 7.7
percent of total growth.  The modest growth in
manufacturing relative to recent years in Kentucky
reflects a national decline in manufacturing
employment.
Growth in the Kentucky economy is forecast to
remain moderate over the next three years.  Rates of
growth, however, will vary, similar to national
forecasts.  In particular, growth in 1997 is expected to
2.5%
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be slightly lower than growth in the other two years. 
According to many measures, the fastest rates of
growth will be for 1998.  Gross state product growth
is forecast to exceed 3.0 percent in 1998, while
employment and income growth are expected to be
near 2.0 percent.
Gross State Product and Employment
Gross state product (GSP) is a comprehensive
measure of economic activity which includes capital
consumption, profits, business tax payments, as well
as employment and earnings.  As a result, analysis of
gross state product data can sometimes lead to a
different perspective than analysis of a less
comprehensive measure, such as employment growth.
Discussion of employment growth data below
will indicate that retail and service industries are
forecast to account for most of the employment
growth in Kentucky over the next three years.  But,
analysis of gross state product forecasts for Kentucky
indicates that goods-producing industries such as
manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and construction
are expected to account for a substantial share of
Kentucky’s economic growth.  Estimates of gross
state product for 1995 indicate that goods-producing
industries currently account for 38.2 percent of
Kentucky’s gross state product.  Manufacturing alone
is estimated to account for 26.4 percent of gross state
product.  Non-goods-producing industries such as
services and wholesale and retail trade are estimated
to account for the remaining 61.8 percent of gross
state product.
Growth forecasts indicate that goods-producing
industries will continue to play a substantial role in
the state’s economy.  Figure 2 indicates that goods-
producing industries are expected to account for 43.8
percent of growth in gross state product from the
fourth quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 1998. 
Manufacturing is forecast to account for 35.3 percent
of that growth, retail and wholesale trade businesses
16.7 percent, and services 14.5 percent of growth.  As
these predictions illustrate, manufacturing and other
goods-producing industries remain key to the growth
of the Kentucky economy.
Strong growth in GSP is consistent with growing
employment.  However, an increasing GSP does not
guarantee that employment will likewise increase. 
Productivity, or GSP per worker, can grow rapidly
enough in some industries that total employment will
decline even as gross product grows.  This trend is
occurring nationally in many manufacturing, mining,
and construction industries.  Figure 3 shows indices
for employment in 1996 through 1998 compared to
employment in the fourth quarter of 1995.  As
depicted, goods-producing employment is forecast to
decline in the United States from the fourth quarter of
1995 through the fourth quarter of 1998. 
Employment is forecast to decline at an annual rate of
0.6 percent.  But, the trend is different among goods-
producing industries in Kentucky, which are expected
to add employment in Kentucky.  Employment is
forecast to increase at a rate of 0.9 percent each year.
Faster growth among goods-producing industries
is a primary reason why employment in Kentucky is
forecast to grow faster than employment in the United
States.  This is because employment growth in most
other industries is not forecast to be greater in
Kentucky than nationally.  This trend is also
illustrated in Figure 3, which shows that national
growth will be slightly greater for non-goods-
producing industries.  Non-goods-producing
industries are forecast to grow by 2.3 percent per year
in Kentucky compared to 2.5 percent nationally. Non-
goods-producing industries include the services,
retail, government, transportation, communications
and public utilities, and finance, insurance, and real
estate industries.
Income
Income growth in Kentucky over the next three
years is expected to match national growth.  Figure 4
shows indices of real total personal income for
Kentucky and the United States.  Real income refers
to income adjusted for inflation.  Both Kentucky and
the nation should achieve an annual real personal
income growth of 1.7 percent.
Kentucky’s rate of income growth is not the
result of a similar forecast for population growth,
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which is forecast to grow more slowly in Kentucky
than nationally.  Rather, increase in income is due to
a faster growth forecast for income per person in
Kentucky.  Per person, or per capita, income in
Kentucky is forecast to grow by 0.9 percent compared
to 0.8 percent nationally.  Kentucky’s more rapid
expansion is resulting in faster-rising average
incomes for its residents.
Population
Population growth in Kentucky, after stagnating
in the late 1980s, resumed in the early 1990s.  A
change in migration rates into and out of Kentucky
has been the key factor leading to this recent increase.
Rising in-migration, reduced out-migration, or both,
has lead to a strong rise in net migration, which is the
number of persons migrating to Kentucky minus the
number migrating out of the state.  This positive net
migration allowed the state to grow faster than it
would have based solely on the natural increase of
population.3
Net migration has increased to the point where
Kentucky’s population is forecast to grow at nearly
the same rate as the nation’s population.  From 1996
to 1998, Kentucky’s population is forecast to grow by
0.85 percent annually while the nation’s population is
forecast to average 0.91 percent growth. This state
figure translates into an average increase of 33,000
residents each year.  Of that total, 21,900 is due to net
migration.
This strong growth, however, is not forecast in
all population groups.  As nationally, Kentucky’s
forecast shows an aging population.  Little increase is
expected among younger age groups.  The five to 19
age group, which closely approximates the school age
population, is forecast to remain roughly unchanged
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from 1996 to 1998.  Growth will average less than 0.1
percent per year.  At the same time, some older age
groups should grow rapidly.  In particular, population
is forecast to grow quickly among the older portions
of the labor force.  The population of 50 to 59 year
olds is expected to grow by 8.0 percent over the three
year period.  This translates into a 2.6 percent
average annual increase.  Population is also forecast
to grow quickly among the oldest portion of the
population.  The number of persons over age 85
should grow by 14.8 percent over the next three years
for an annual average increase of 4.7 percent.
Forecast Detail
Growth of the Kentucky economy is forecast to
be consistent as well as broad-based in the next three
years.  Underlying differences, however, exist in the
growth of different industries and different sources of
income. These differences are explored below.
Employment
The strong employment picture in Kentucky is
the result of broad-based growth.  As nationally, the
majority of growth is forecast to occur in retail and
service industries.  But, in Kentucky, nearly all
industries are forecast to add employment although
some, including coal mining and federal government
employment, are expected to lose employment. 
Manufacturing clearly has been one of the
strengths of the Kentucky economy in recent years. 
Manufacturing employment has increased by 16,000
jobs in the last few years in Kentucky while growing
very slowly nationally.  Despite a forecast for
national decline, manufacturing employment is
forecast to continue to grow in Kentucky at an annual
rate of 1.0 percent.  Further, at least some job growth
is expected in nearly every manufacturing industry in
Kentucky.  Fifteen of the 20 manufacturing industries
listed in Table 1 are forecast to add employment. 
Only furniture and fixtures, electric machinery, food
products, tobacco, and leather products are forecast to
reduce employment.  Even in these industries,
declines are not expected to exceed several hundred
jobs.  The most rapidly growing manufacturing
industries in Kentucky are forecast to be
transportation equipment, rubber and miscellaneous
plastic products, and paper products.
Employment growth in construction industries
mirrors that of manufacturing.  Construction
employment is forecast to grow by 1,100 jobs per
year from 1996 to 1998 for a 1.5 percent annual
growth rate.  This rate of growth is in contrast to a 0.2
percent decline for the nation.  Coal mining remains
one declining portion of Kentucky employment.  It
should be noted, though, that the drop in coal mining
employment has moderated in recent years.  After
declining by 1,400 jobs per year in the last five years,
coal mining employment is forecast to decline by 600
jobs per year from 1996 to 1998.
Goods-producing industries are forecast to grow
faster in Kentucky than nationally, which is not the
case in most other industries.  Non-goods-producing
industries, which include retail, services, and
government employment, are forecast to grow at
roughly the same rate in Kentucky as nationally,
particularly in trade and service industries.  Growth in
these industries is largely the result of local growth in
population and income.  These industries are growing
at a similar rate in Kentucky and the nation because
income and population are also growing at a similar
rate.
Both nationally and in Kentucky, however, some
service industries are experiencing substantial growth.
Changing patterns in consumer spending and business
practices have created a rapidly growing demand for
these industries. Two such service industries, health
services and business services, are listed separately in
Table 1.  A trend towards outsourcing services rather
than keeping in-house staff is one of the reasons the
business services sector is growing more quickly. 
Business services also includes the rapidly growing
information services and software design industries. 
Consumer spending on health services is also rising
more rapidly than spending in general.
Growth in government employment in Kentucky
also is forecast to track growth in the rest of the
economy.  However, a distinction should be drawn
between the growth of federal government
employment and state and local government
employment.  Federal employment is expected to
decline as federal spending is reduced.  At the same
time, state and local government employment will
continue to grow at a moderate rate of about 1.7
percent.  This figure is somewhat less than the 2.4
percent growth forecast for state and local
government employment nationally. A slow growth
forecast for state government employment in
Kentucky is one reason for this lower Kentucky
growth rate.
In summary, service, retail, government, and
other non-goods-producing industries will account for
most of the job growth in Kentucky. But, the strong
performance of manufacturing and construction is the
source of faster overall rate of job growth in
Kentucky than nationally.
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Income
Transfer income has been growing at a faster rate
than wage and salary income in both Kentucky and
the United States.  The forecasts of income by source
presented in Table 3, however, indicate that transfer
income will not be the main source of income growth
in Kentucky in the next three years.  In fact, transfer
income is forecast to grow only slightly faster in
TABLE 1
Growth Rates for Non-Farm Employment
by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted
1995 Employ-
ment
1996 Quarterly Growth (at an
Annual Rate) (%)
Annual Growth (%) Growth Growth
Rates (%)
4th Q 1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 1996 1997 1998 KY KY US
Total Non-farm 1653.7 2.1 2.3 2.3 1.8 2.1 1.7 2.0 32.9 2.0 1.8
Goods-Producing 411.2 1.0 1.6 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.4 1.3 3.6 0.9 -0.6
Mining 27.2 1.9 -0.5 -3.7 -3.7 -1.5 -3.4 -2.9 -0.7 -2.6 -1.3
Coal Mining 23.4 2.3 -0.4 -4.1 -4.0 -1.6 -3.6 -3.3 -0.6 -2.8 NA
Construction 74.7 3.6 2.2 1.6 0.3 1.9 0.8 1.7 1.1 1.5 -0.2
Manufacturing 309.3 0.3 1.6 1.0 0.5 0.9 0.7 1.5 3.2 1.0 -0.6
Food Products 22.8 -1.2 0.3 -0.1 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.0
Tobacco 4.5 -2.9 -6.6 -6.6 -4.9 -5.2 -5.4 -5.1 -0.2 -5.3 -3.3
Textiles 9.1 -1.2 0.1 1.8 3.6 1.1 1.6 0.9 0.1 1.2 -0.1
Apparel 27.9 3.0 3.4 1.2 -0.1 1.9 0.3 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.0
Paper Products 12.0 3.2 1.0 1.3 2.5 2.0 2.7 3.0 0.3 2.6 -0.1
Printing and 
Publishing
21.0 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.9 0.4 1.7 0.9
Chemicals 14.9 2.6 6.6 0.6 -1.5 2.0 -0.7 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4
Petroleum and 
Coal Refining
3.6 2.2 1.2 0.9 0.6 1.2 -0.2 -0.5 0.0 0.2 -1.9
Rubber and 
Plastic Products
19.0 2.2 6.5 9.4 4.5 5.6 4.5 5.6 1.0 5.2 0.3
Leather Products 1.5 -7.1 -3.6 -5.6 -7.0 -5.9 -4.6 -3.7 -0.1 -4.7 -2.2
Lumber Products 13.7 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.8 2.3 0.3 1.8 -0.4
Furniture and 
Fixtures
4.6 2.9 2.7 -1.9 -1.2 0.6 -2.3 -1.7 -0.1 -1.1 0.6
Stone, Clay, and 
Glass Products
10.9 -0.2 0.7 1.9 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.7 -0.9
Primary Metals 17.2 0.1 3.9 -0.1 1.2 1.3 -0.3 0.8 0.1 0.6 -1.4
Fabricated Metals 21.9 0.0 2.4 1.8 -0.5 0.9 0.4 1.2 0.2 0.8 -0.2
Non-electric 
Machinery
33.9 -0.9 -0.2 1.3 0.9 0.3 -0.7 1.0 0.1 0.2 -1.6
Electric 
Machinery
29.0 3.4 -3.5 -3.0 -2.5 -1.4 -0.7 -0.7 -0.3 -0.9 -0.3
Transportation 
Equipment
33.3 -5.4 3.6 0.7 1.0 -0.1 2.6 5.7 0.9 2.8 -3.7
Instruments and 
Related 
Products
3.8 0.7 1.9 2.6 2.1 1.8 -0.5 -1.4 0.0 0.0 -1.6
Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing
4.8 0.2 0.3 -0.8 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.4 0.1 1.1 1.1
Non-goods-Producing 1242.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.3 29.3 2.3 2.5
TCPU 90.4 2.5 2.3 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.9 0.9
Trade 401.6 2.1 1.9 2.8 1.5 2.1 1.9 2.0 8.1 2.0 2.0
Wholesale 78.1 2.0 0.0 5.3 -0.4 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.7
Retail 323.6 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.2 1.9 2.1 6.8 2.1 2.1
FIRE 64.1 2.4 1.7 1.4 0.7 1.5 0.7 1.6 0.8 1.3 0.8
Services 393.0 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.7 14.4 3.5 3.6
Health Services 139.8 2.8 3.2 3.7 4.0 3.4 4.1 3.9 5.5 3.8 3.7
Business Services 72.3 4.1 5.0 5.1 5.1 4.8 5.5 5.8 4.1 5.4 NA
Government 293.3 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.5 0.8 1.0 4.3 1.4 1.7
Federal 41.9 -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.9
State and Local 251.4 2.8 3.2 3.2 2.9 3.0 1.0 1.2 4.4 1.7 2.4
State 88.7 0.4 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 NA
Local 162.8 4.1 4.3 4.3 3.9 4.2 1.0 1.4 3.6 2.2 NA
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Kentucky than wage and salary income.  And, since it
is already the largest source of income in the state,
wage and salary income will remain the primary
source of income growth.
Of the $2.55 billion (1982-84 dollars) of real
income growth forecast for Kentucky over the next
three years, $1.41 billion is forecast due to growth in
incomes are forecast to account for 68.9 percent of
income growth in Kentucky.  Growth in transfer
income is forecast to account for 23.7 percent of
income growth.4
The above figures show the relative importance
of the different components of income to the
Kentucky economy but do not  show the relative rates
of growth for each component.  These rates of growth
are shown in Table 3.  These figures indicate that
transfer income is forecast to rise at a slightly
faster rate in Kentucky than wage and salary income.
Transfer income is expected on average to grow 0.4
percent faster.  But, by far the fastest rate of growth is
forecast for benefit income.  Benefit income, which
includes health insurance costs, is forecast to grow by
3.3 percent a year.  These rates of growth for
Kentucky are similar to what is forecast for the
nation. 
Another interesting pattern is the decline of
Kentucky’s residential adjustment, which is the
difference between what Kentuckians earn working in
other states minus what residents of other states earn
working in Kentucky.  The decline in residential
adjustment indicates that one expected result of
Kentucky’s forecast employment growth is an
increase in workers from nearby states finding work
in Kentucky, a decrease in the number of Kentuckians
working in nearby states, or both.
Risks to the Forecast
The forecast presented for the Kentucky
economy is based in part on the baseline October
forecast for the United States economy produced by
DRI/McGraw Hill.  This baseline national forecast
represents a moderate, most likely scenario for the
economy over the next three years.  Use of this
moderate national forecast implies that the Kentucky
forecast is also a moderate forecast.  It represents a
moderate scenario for the state’s economy among a
group of possible scenarios.  The national economy
TABLE 3
Growth Rates for Real Personal Income
by Source, Seasonally Adjusted
1995 1996 Quarterly Growth Annual Annual Averages
Income  (at an Annual Rate) (%) Growth (%) Growth Growth Rates (%)
4th Q 1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 1996 1997 1998 KY KY US
Total Personal Income 47797.1 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.9 849.8 1.7 1.7
Wage and Salary Income 26098.7 2.2 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 470.8 1.8 1.7
Other Labor Income (Benefits) 3410.9 -0.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.5 3.5 3.8 115.2 3.3 3.7
Proprietors' Income 3654.2 1.1 1.3 0.9 -0.1 0.8 -0.2 0.6 15.0 0.4 0.9
Residential Adjustment -126.4 -11.8 -13.5 -12.1 -7.8 -11.3 -7.1 -9.4 -12.8 -9.2 NA
Contributions to Social Insurance 2212.2 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.2 46.0 2.0 2.4
Transfer Income 9370.1 5.4 1.7 1.6 0.6 2.3 1.1 2.9 201.7 2.1 2.0
Dividends, Interest, Rent 6739.4 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.4 107.0 1.6 1.3
Per Capita Income 12372.2 1.7 0.8 0.9 0.5 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.1 0.9 0.8
TABLE 2
Growth Rates for Real Gross State Product (GSP)
by Major Industry Group, Seasonally Adjusted
1995
GSP
1996 Quarterly Growth (at an
Annual Rate) (%)
Annual Growth Annual Averages
4th Q 1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 1996 1997 1998 Growth Growth
Rate (%)
Total 69454.0 3.3 2.6 3.0 2.5 2.9 2.3 3.2 1983.3 2.8
Agriculture 2476.7 7.4 -9.7 6.3 5.2 2.1 -2.3 10.2 81.6 3.3
Mining 2815.3 6.7 5.3 2.3 1.3 3.9 1.0 1.5 60.4 2.1
Construction 2882.2 1.4 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.7 1.4 26.5 0.9
Manufacturing 18344.1 3.0 3.8 3.7 2.5 3.3 3.4 4.4 700.2 3.7
TCPU 6596.5 3.4 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.2 214.5 3.2
Trade 10093.7 4.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.0 3.3 330.3 3.2
FIRE 8825.4 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.8 154.8 1.7
Services 9404.3 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.9 3.0 286.7 3.0
Government 8015.7 3.0 3.2 3.1 2.7 3.0 0.7 1.0 128.3 1.6
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has other potential outcomes, which in turn could be
played out in the Kentucky economy.  The three
alternative national scenarios are examined below.
First, the DRI/McGraw-Hill forecast may have
overstated the strength of the United States economy.
In this scenario, the national economy will remain
weak and perhaps even slip into recession.  This
scenario would show stagnant employment and output
growth in early 1996 but more rapid growth than the
baseline forecast in 1997 and 1998.  DRI has
assigned a probability of ten percent to this scenario.
Second, the economy could grow more quickly
than believed in the baseline forecast due to rising
productivity and higher than expected business
investment.  This scenario also assumes that low
inflation would discourage the Federal Reserve from
raising interest rates despite stronger growth.  DRI
has assigned a probability of 20 percent to this
scenario.
A final possibility also involves more rapid
growth than the baseline forecast in the United States
and Kentucky economies in 1996 and 1997.  But,
rising bond yields would lead to a slowdown in 1998
in this boom and bust scenario.  DRI has assigned a
probability of 15 percent to this scenario.
Conclusions
The forecast for moderate growth in the
Kentucky economy is based on a moderate, baseline
forecast for the national economy.  While the
Kentucky economy is expected to follow the national
economy, it will differ in several important respects. 
Kentucky’s economy is forecast to grow slightly
faster than the national economy.  Faster growth in
per capita income, gross state product, and
employment is expected for Kentucky in most
quarters from 1996 to 1998.  This growth is also
expected to lead to lower unemployment rates in
Kentucky than the nation, and to encourage
population growth in Kentucky.  Population is
forecast to grow in Kentucky at just below the
national rate, which is a vast increase relative to
stagnant growth in the late 1980s.
While most job growth is forecast to occur in
retail and service industries, job growth in
manufacturing and construction is expected to be the
key source of faster growth in Kentucky’s economy. 
Retail and service employment in Kentucky are
forecast to grow at about the same rate as nationally. 
Manufacturing employment is forecast to grow by 1.0
percent each year in Kentucky while declining 0.6
percent annually in the nation.  Manufacturing is also
expected to be the fastest-growing component of
gross state product in Kentucky.  In addition, despite
the growing importance of transfer payments, the
wage, salary, and benefit returns from working are
forecast to be the primary source of income growth in
Kentucky during the next three years.
Notes
1 Complete employment data was only available for the first three
quarters of 1995 so fourth quarter values are estimates.
2 Personal income and population data for Kentucky are not yet
available for 1995.  Thus, income and population values needed
to be forecast for 1995 based on the Kentucky employment data
which is available and national values for income growth. 
Kentucky employment growth and unemployment data are key
inputs into forecasts of the migration component of population
and the wage and salary, benefits, and proprietor’s income
components of personal income.
3 Moderate series birth and survival rates were taken from
Michael Price, Thomas Sawyer, and Martye Scobee, How
Many Kentuckians: Population Forecast 1995-2020,
Population Research, Kentucky State Data Center, University of
Louisville, 1993.
4 This forecast assumes significant reductions in welfare, medical
programs, federal employee pensions, and other transfer
payments like those currently under consideration by the federal
government.
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Appendix: National Forecast
The forecast for Kentucky is based on baseline
national forecasts from the Data Resources, Inc.
(DRI)/McGraw-Hill publication Review of the U. S.
Economy for October 1995.  National variables
forecast by DRI/McGraw-Hill are key variables in
nearly every part of the University of Kentucky State
Econometric Model.1
The baseline national forecast from DRI/McGraw-
Hill shows an economy which has successfully
achieved a “soft landing” and is moving toward
moderate growth for 1996 through 1998.  The
economy is even expected to grow robustly in the near
term.  Gross domestic product growth should reach 3.0
percent in the first quarter of 1996.  But, throughout the
remainder of 1996 and beyond, economic growth is
forecast to be more moderate.  Gross domestic product
is forecast to grow by 2.4 percent in 1996, 2.6 percent
in 1997, and 2.6 percent in 1998.  Non-farm
employment is forecast to grow by 1.9 percent in 1996,
1.6 percent in 1997, and 1.7 percent in 1998.  The
unemployment rate will be near 5.7 percent in 1996,
5.9 percent in 1997, and 6.0 percent in 1998.
This moderate forecast results from a mixed
performance in different sectors of the economy. 
Improvements in manufacturing productivity, exports,
and foreign direct investment are factors expected to
spur the economy.  Output per hour of work is forecast
to rise by 4.0 percent annually in manufacturing
industries.  Strong productivity growth and an
increasingly global economy should spur exports,
which are expected to grow between eight and nine
percent in each of the next three years while imports
are forecast to grow by just seven percent annually. 
Foreign direct investment will grow by four percent
annually after averaging just 1.4 percent growth in
1994 and 1995.
One steadying influence on the economy will be
consumer confidence, which is expected to remain just
below current levels in 1996 through 1998. 
Investments will be another steadying influence.  Non-
residential investment, which grew at a double-digit
pace in 1994 and 1995, is expected to steady in the
next three years to an average growth rate of 4.6
percent per year.  Housing (residential fixed
investments) fell for 1995 but is expected to rise to 0.9
percent growth in 1996 and 3.6 percent growth in
1998.  However, housing is forecast to fall 0.9 percent
in 1997.
The main drag on the economy for the short term
could be contraction of the federal government’s
contribution to the gross domestic product.  That
contribution is expected to decline by 5.8 percent in
1996, 3.3 percent in 1997, and 4.2 percent in 1998.2 
The direct impact of this contraction will be to reduce
demand for goods and services, which in turn will slow
economic growth.  It is unclear, however, how
substantial that impact will be since reduced federal
spending would lead to lower deficits.  The federal
budget deficit is forecast to decline in nominal terms
from $160.5 billion in 1995 to $119.1 billion in 1998. 
Lower deficits could lead to lower interest rates, which
may spur demand and compensate for some of the
reduced demand by the federal government.
Inflation is expected to increase by 3.0 percent in
each of the next three years.  In the context of
moderate inflation and declining deficits, the Federal
Reserve is expected to have some leverage to lower
interest rates.  The prime interest rate is expected to
fall from a 1995 average of 8.8 percent to 8.3 percent
in 1996, 8.1 percent in 1997, and 8.0 percent in 1998.
Notes
1 National industrial production and productivity by industry are
variables in manufacturing and mining, gross state product, and
employment equations.  National consumer spending and
industry employment variables are important inputs for retail
and service equations.  National data on income growth by
source is a key variable in input growth equations.
2 DRI forecasts assume that a version of the seven year deficit
balancing plan will be adopted but that the government will begin
having problems following the plan in 1998 when planned cuts
become greater.
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U. S. Economy Experiences “Soft
Landing” in 1995; Look for
More of the Same in 1996
J. Robert Gillette
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Kentucky
Introduction
In 1995 the United States economy moved well
into its fifth year of economic expansion since the last
recession ending March 1991 and experienced the
much publicized “soft landing.”  The Federal Reserve
(Fed) engineered this “soft landing” with a series of
interest rate hikes from February 1994 to February
1995.  The “soft landing” refers to the slowing down
of an overheating economy on the verge of driving up
inflation, to an economy
growing near its full-
employment growth rate
with low inflation.  The
delicate balance of
slowing the economy
without also causing a
recession (a “hard
landing”) appeared in
jeopardy in the second
quarter of 1995 when the
economy stumbled, and
many wondered whether the Fed had over-tightened
monetary policy.
Along with explaining where the U. S. economy
has been in 1995, and where it will likely be in 1996,
I first review the 1994 economy.  The booming 1994
economy, along with the Fed’s 1994 preemptive
strike against inflation, set the stage for understanding
the economy in 1995.
1994 Economy: Summary
and the Fed’s Preemptive
Strike Against Inflation
The U. S. economy in 1994 went gangbusters.
Real gross domestic product (GDP), the value of all
final goods and services produced in the U. S.
adjusted for inflation, grew at an annual rate of 4.1
percent, which represents the highest growth rate of
real GDP since 1984.  As Figure 1 shows, real GDP
grew at an annual rate of 3.3 percent in the first
quarter, increased to 4.1 percent and 4.0 percent in
the second and third quarters, and jumped to a
whopping 5.1 percent in the fourth quarter.
The unemployment rate, as Figure 2 shows,
declined throughout the year, starting at 6.7 percent in
January and declining to
5.4 percent in December.
Non-farm payroll
employment increased by
an average of 294,000 per
month, representing the
highest percentage increase
in payroll employment
since 1988.  Manufacturing
jobs increased by an
average of 30,000 per
month.
In 1996, slow to moderate
growth with low inflation should
occur.  The forecast for real
GDP centers around 2.5 percent
growth.
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Inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price
Index (CPI), dropped to only 2.6 percent, the lowest
annual rate since 1986.  Short-term and long-term
interest rates increased throughout the year as the
Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy and the
booming economy raised the expectation of future
inflation.
With the economy booming and at full
employment, the Federal Reserve correctly became
concerned about an increase in inflation.  A booming
economy is wonderful if it is sustainable, but a
booming economy at full employment cannot be
sustained and will eventually drive up inflation as the
economy overheats.
To slow the economy to a sustainable growth rate
and prevent higher inflation, the Fed’s policy-making
arm, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC),
raised interest rates eight times from February 1994
through February 1995.  Specifically, the Fed raised
the federal funds rate (the rate banks charge other
banks for overnight loans) from three to six percent in
a series of actions designed to prevent inflationary
pressures from becoming embedded in the economy.
Slowing down a booming economy never makes
the Fed popular.  In 1994 the Fed took additional
criticism because the much-feared inflation it was
supposedly fighting did not appear in the 1994
monthly inflation numbers.  Yet the Fed continued its
tightening of monetary policyraising interest
ratesanyway.  With inflation generally static, why
did the Fed keep fighting it?
The answer revolves around the fact that
monetary policychanges in the money supply and
interest rates—does not impact the economy quickly,
but with a considerable lag.  Tightening monetary
policy has little impact on inflation for six to nine
months, and does not have its full effect on reducing
inflation for about 1½ to 2 years.  Such extended lags
force the Fed to prevent an increase in inflation by
launching a preemptive attack on inflation.  The
inflation the Fed fought in 1994 was not the inflation
for early-to-mid 1994.  It was too late for the Fed to
impact those inflation rates.  In 1994, the Fed was
fighting inflation for late 1994, 1995, and even 1996.
If the Fed waits for inflation to show up before it
acts, it will be too late.  As Fed Vice-Chairman Alan
Blinder is fond of saying, the Bunker Hill
strategywait until you see the whites of their eyes
and then firedoes not work for monetary policy.  If
you wait to see the whites of their eyes, you’re dead.
If the whites of their eyes are showing inflation,
you’re about one year too late to prevent it.
1995 Economy: “Soft Landing”
The economy landed softly in 1995 with
moderate growth and low inflation.  The Fed
successfully contained inflation and slowed the
overheating economy without causing a recession.
The soft landing appeared in jeopardy at the
beginning of the second quarter when many economic
indicators pointed down.  Some observers feared a
recession, wondering if the Federal Reserve had over-
tightened monetary policy.
As Figure 1 shows, real GDP slowed during the
first quarter to an annual rate of 2.7 percent, slowed
further during the second quarter to 1.3 percent, but
picked up during the third quarter to a surprisingly
strong 4.2 percent.  For the first three quarters, real
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GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.7 percent.  If the
economy hits the consensus forecast for the fourth
quarter of 2.4 percent growth (discussed below), then
real GDP will grow just over 2.6 percent.
Inflation through October, as measured by the
Consumer Price Index, equaled an annual rate of 2.9
percent.  Inflation accelerated in the first five months
of 1995, running at an annual rate of 3.6 percent, but
subsequently slowed down to a rate a little above the
2.6 percent rate of 1994.
The unemployment rate, as Figure 2 shows,
hovered around 5.6 percent, averaging 5.7 percent
during the second quarter weakness and dropping to
5.5 percent in October.  Non-farm payroll
employment increased at an average of 137,700 per
month through October.
Industrial productionoutput of factories,
mines, and utilitiesleveled off  in 1995.  As Figure
3 shows, the monthly index of industrial production
rose considerably in 1994, at a 6.1 percent rate.  In
1995, though, industrial production through October
remained in the 121 to 122 range.  In fact, the
October industrial production index barely exceeded
its January value.  With this slowing pace, payroll
employment in manufacturing through October
decreased by an average of 16,500 jobs per month.
Business inventories through April rose relative
to sales.  In the second quarter and even into the third
quarter, businesses slowed production to expend
excess inventories.  With the start of the fourth
quarter, inventories appeared to be back at
appropriate levels.
 The U. S. dollar went on a roller coaster ride in
1995, especially against the Japanese yen.  The dollar
started the year just above 100 yen per dollar.  In
February, however, the dollar plunged, hitting in late
April a post-World War II low of 79.85 against the
yen.  The dollar remained low until August, then
climbed to stand again at 100 yen per dollar.  Against
a broader index of nineteen currencies, the dollar’s
plunge was not as severe, but neither has it fully
regained all of its lost value against the broader
currency index.
The dollar’s decline throughout most of 1995
stimulated U. S. exports, since the cost of the exports
to other countries dropped.  This boost was
particularly helpful given the weakness in the
economies of our major trading partners—Canada,
Europe, Japan, and Mexico.  As other economies
slow down, they also curtail purchases of U. S.
exports.  Mexico, with its peso devaluation, suffered
a severe recession, seeing its real GDP decline about
seven percent.
Unlike 1994, the Federal Reserve was not as
active in 1995.  In the inflation fight, it raised interest
rates for the last time on February 1, pushing up the
federal funds rate by half a percentage point to six
percent.  With the economy slowing and the inflation
outlook benign, in July the Fed cut the federal funds
rate by a quarter percentage point to 5.75 percent.
If Congress and the President have passed a
budget accord by the end of 1995, the Fed will almost
certainly cut rates again in December by at least a
quarter percentage point.  The bond and stock
markets have already factored into current bond and
stock prices a significant deficit reduction package
and a Fed rate cut, which have pushed up bond and
stock prices and pushed down long-term interest
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rates.  The budget accord, which would eliminate the
federal budget deficit by 2002, will be somewhat of a
short-term drag on the economy.  Reductions in
federal spending would likewise reduce the
economy’s aggregate spending.  To neutralize this
drag, and to encourage deficit reduction, the Fed has
indicated that it will cut interest rates if inflation
remains benign.
Interest rates, especially long-term rates, dropped
substantially in 1995.  In 1994 these rates rose
throughout the year, but favorable inflation, the
prospect of significant deficit reduction, and Fed rate
cuts generated significant decline in 1995.  Rates
leveled off, even rose somewhat, in the middle of the
year, but declined again in late August.  By mid-
November, the long bondthe 30-year Treasury
bondhit its lowest level since January 1994 when it
yielded 6.22 percent.
At this time, the fourth quarter of 1995 is causing
some nervousness.  The consensus forecast centers
around 2.4 percent growth in real GDP, but most
analysts would be content with anything above 2.0
percent.  In October, the first month of the fourth
quarter, retail sales fell 0.2 percent and industrial
production fell 0.3 percent.  With relatively high
consumer debt loads and weakened consumer
spending, early indications are that a somewhat below
average Christmas selling season will have resulted.
1996 Forecast: Look for
More of the Same
In 1996, slow to moderate growth with low
inflation should occur.  The forecast for real GDP
centers around 2.5 percent growth.  The Blue Chip
Economic Indicators Poll of fifty private-sector
economists had a consensus forecast for real GDP
growth in 1996 of 2.5 percent, with the highest ten
forecasts averaging 3.1 percent and lowest ten
averaging 1.9 percent.  The Federal Reserve, in its
1995 semiannual report issued to Congress in July,
forecast real GDP growth of 2.25 percent to 2.75
percent in 1996.
The inflation forecast centers right around three
percent.  The National Association of Business
Economists’ forecast a 1996 inflation rate of 3.1
percent, and the Fed in its semiannual report forecast
an inflation rate of 2.875 percent to 3.25 percent.
Further, the Fed forecast an unemployment rate in
1996 of 5.75 percent to 6.125 percent.
With a benign inflation outlook, a sluggish
economy in the fourth quarter of 1995, and the
prospects of a federal budget accord, look for the
Federal Reserve to lower interest rates at least twice,
having begun in December 1995.  Even though
interest rates are currently low, the so-called real
interest ratesinterest rates adjusted for
inflationare above their historical average, making
current monetary policy modestly tight.
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Introduction
In perhaps one of the most significant public
policy shifts in decades, Congress is proposing to
“end welfare as we know it” by eliminating
guarantees of federal assistance to the poor. 
Although numerous federal welfare programs are
subject to reform, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) is perhaps the best-known cash
assistance benefit program.  AFDC was established
through the Social Security Act of 1935 to provide
limited support for
children whose parents
could not provide for
them due to death,
absence, or disability. In
the 1930s, this program
was conceived to assist
children of widowed
mothers.  By 1962, the
program had expanded to
provide benefits to the parent and the child.  Since
that time, a number of societal and economic
factors

the growing number of women in the
workplace, the rise in divorce and out-of-wedlock
births, and the increase of federal spending and
welfare rolls

have raised questions about the intent
and continued mission of the program.1  
While AFDC expenditures account for less than
one percent of the federal budget, this anti-poverty
program is one of the most controversial.  Much of
the dispute involves the design of AFDC as an
entitlement, a feature which some policy makers
consider a primary disincentive to work.  In an 
entitlement program such as AFDC, all individuals
who meet eligibility criteria are “entitled” to receive
                                                          
We thank David Witt and Virginia Wilson of the Legislative
Research Commission, and staff, including Ann Hager, at the
Cabinet for Human Resources for their assistance.
benefits, regardless of their ability or capacity for
employment.  The program also creates a high
implicit marginal tax rate so that welfare often pays
more than work.  Noting the rise in single-parent
households and out-of-wedlock births, policy makers
are concerned that welfare in its current form has
contributed to the breakdown of the American family.
 They fear that work disincentives of the program
combined with the disintegrating family has fostered
“a culture of dependency.”
Added to the social concerns is a congressional
drive to reduce the federal
deficit by downsizing
government.  Policy makers
reflect the current public
mood when they state as
Texas Senator Phil Gramm
did that “people have to get
out of the wagon and start
helping to pull it.”  In
tandem with the call for
deficit reduction is the growing desire of states to
renegotiate their relationship with the federal
government as they seek increased autonomy in the
use of federal funds for programs like AFDC.  The
debate has led to the development of welfare reform
proposals in the U.S. House of Representatives and
Senate.  The key feature of both reform packages
would combine funds for several federal anti-poverty
programs, including AFDC, into block grants to
states, with the purpose of providing greater
flexibility in the use of the funds. Both welfare reform
proposals also address budget reduction by cutting
the amount states would receive through the block
grants in an effort projected to save the federal
government between $70-100 million over seven
years.  In this paper, we discuss the likely impact of
the block grant proposals on Kentucky’s AFDC
program and their effect on the state’s efforts to
reform its welfare program.
In theory, block grants give
states greater flexibility . . . but
that discretion is often lost to
increased federal regulation.
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Congressional Welfare Reform Proposals
President Bill Clinton campaigned in 1992 to
change “welfare as we know it.”  Following his
election, however, federal health care reform efforts
sidelined his welfare campaign.  Two years later
Republican candidates in the mid-term 1994 elections
reinvigorated the welfare debate in a “Contract with
America.”  Among the “Contract” clauses was a
provision that the candidates, once elected, would
pass a welfare reform bill within the first 100 days of
their terms which would combine several anti-poverty
programs into single block grants to states,
eliminating open-ended federal entitlements. 
Currently, objective criteria are used to determine
individuals’ eligibility for government aid, with all
who meet the standard receiving benefits.  Block
grants, however, would end the entitlement guarantee
and offer states greater flexibility in determining who
receives benefits and the amount of the benefit
payment.
House Republican leaders were successful in
passing a welfare reform bill, HR 4, or the Personal
TABLE 1
Key Features of Current AFDC Policy in Kentucky and Federal Welfare Reform
Current AFDC Policy in Kentucky HR 4 (House Bill) Personal
Responsibility Act
Senate Substitute to HR 4
Unmarried minors and their children are
currently eligible for AFDC.
Prohibits cash assistance to a child born
out of wedlock to a mother under 19.
State has the option to prohibit aid to
children born out of wedlock to mothers
under 18.
Additional children may be added to the AFDC
grant. (The grant does not increase for an
additional number after 7.)
Denies additional aid to mothers
who have more children on welfare.
Does not prohibit aid to additional
children.
Requires all AFDC recipients to participate in the
Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS)
Program if they reside in an active JOBS county
and do not meet exemption criteria, such as being
a caretaker of a child under age 3 or disabled
household member, or an ill or incapacitated
recipient.
Requires adults receiving cash assistance
to work or participate in state-designed
program.
Same work requirement.  States may
exempt families with children under
age 1.
Must be a U.S. citizen or eligible alien. Eliminates aid to non-citizens, with few
exceptions.
Sources: HR 4, the Personal Responsibility Act, passed March 24, 1995; Senate substitute to HR 4, the Family Self-Sufficiency Act, passed
September 19, 1995.  Kentucky policy provisions provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources.
TABLE 2
Additional Federal AFDC Reform Proposals
HR 4 (House Bill) Personal Responsibility Act Senate Substitute to HR 4
Requires recipients to work after 2 years. Requires recipients to work after 2 years.
Prohibits assistance to families who have received block grant funds
for five years.
Prohibits assistance to families who have received block grant
funds for 5 years.
Intended to save $102 billion over 7 years.  Cost is capped at $15.4
billion annually for 5 years.  Freezes each state's share of funding at
the higher of FY 94 federal obligations or the average FY 1992-94
obligations, reduced by 2.4 %.
Intended to save $70 billion over 7 years.  Cost of block grant is
set at $16.8 billion annually.  Freezes each state's share of funding
at FY 94 federal payments for AFDC, IV.A Child Care and JOBS
Program.  
Creates a federal $1 billion "rainy day" loan fund to states if their total
unemployment rate for a three-month period exceeds 6.5 %.  Loans
must be repaid with interest.
Creates an emergency needs loan fund and a contingency grant
fund.
States may lose up to 5 % of their block grant allocation for the next
fiscal year for failure to meet the work participation rates.
States may lose up to 5 % of their block grant allocation for the
next fiscal year for intentionally misspending any funds.
No requirements for state spending level. States must maintain set spending levels (80 percent of current
outlays on cash benefits for up to 5 years)
Makes an additional $3 billion available over five years in federal
matching funds for child care to states that maintain their FY 94
state level of welfare-related child care spending. 
Sources: HR 4, the Personal Responsibility Act, passed March 24, 1995; Senate substitute to HR 4, the Family Self-Sufficiency Act, passed
September 19, 1995.  Kentucky policy provisions provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources.
Block Grants: Building Blocks for Welfare Reform in Kentucky?
Kentucky Annual Economic Report, 1996 17
Responsibility Act.  The bill would block AFDC, the
Emergency Assistance Program, and the Job
Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program into a
single grant known as Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families.2  The bill requires that non-working
welfare recipients work within two years and ends
their cash assistance after five years.  HR 4 also
includes several provisions aimed at discouraging
other suspected outcomes of welfare.  One such
feature is the “family cap,” which would eliminate
cash assistance to additional children born to
individuals already receiving benefits.  HR 4 also
would eliminate cash assistance to children born out
of wedlock to minors.
The Senate version of HR 4 takes a much more
conservative approach to eliminating benefits,
allowing states more discretion in deciding whether
or not to provide aid to teen mothers or mothers who
have additional children on AFDC.  Work
requirements and time limits are the same as those
proposed in the House bill.  The Senate version
makes an additional $3 billion available over five
years in federal matching funds for child care.  Worth
noting in the Senate version also are provisions to
assist states in the event of economic downturns. 
While the House bill provides a $1 billion “rainy
day” fund, the Senate bill offers a contingency fund
and an emergency needs loan fund.  The Senate bill
also requires states to maintain set spending levels of
80 percent of current outlays on cash benefits for up
to five years.  Tables 1 and 2 show the major points
of the House and Senate plans along with Kentucky’s
current policy.
Kentucky’s AFDC Population Profile
Today, Kentucky’s average AFDC recipient is a
white female with two children under age six.  There
is a 50 percent chance that her children were born out
of wedlock and a 25 percent chance that one of her
children was born while she was receiving AFDC
benefits.  There is a 46 percent chance that she did
not finish high school.
In Kentucky, 79,840 AFDC cases were recorded
in 1994.  Those cases included 136,690 children and
71,343 adults.  It follows that the average number of
recipients per case was 2.6 and the average number of
children per case was 1.7.  The average age of
children currently receiving AFDC is 7.9 years.  Of
these children, 32 percent are between 0 and 2 years
of age, 19 percent are between 3 and 5, and 48
percent are 6 years or older.  About 91 percent of
basic AFDC-recipient household heads in Kentucky
are females, slightly short of the national average of
92 percent.  Six percent of the mothers on AFDC are
teenagers, and 53 percent of AFDC-recipient children
were born out of wedlock.  Approximately 54 percent
of AFDC recipients have a high school diploma, the
equivalent, or higher, and ten percent have some 
post-secondary   education.     On  average,   78
TABLE 3
1994 and 1995 Demographic Information
on AFDC Recipients in Kentucky and the United States
Kentucky United States
Variable 1994 1995 Basic AFDC
Recipients
1995 Unemployed
Parent Recipients
1994
Number of recipients
Children
Adults
208,033
136,690
71,343
- - 14,255,591
9,589,898
4,635,693
% cases with female-headed household 90.7 % 51.5 % 92.4 %
% cases with teenage mother 6 % - - NA
% cases with children born after opening case 24.5 % - - 26.2 %
Average number of recipients per case 2.6 - - 3.8
Average number of children per case 1.71 - - 1.90
Average age of child - 7.9 6.8 7.4
Education of adult recipients,
High school diploma or higher
- 54.3 % 44.2 % NA
Education of adult recipients,
Post secondary
- 10.2 % 6.9 % NA
% of cases, recipients white - 77.8 % 96.7% 38.3 %
% of cases, recipients non-white - 22.2 % 3.3 % 61.7 %
% receiving food stamps 92.9 % - - 88.5 %
Average number of years on AFDC 3.9 - - 3.0
Sources: CHR PA-264 Report Series “Public Assistance in Kentucky,” July 1995; “Overview of the AFDC Program, Fiscal Year 1994,” U.
S. Department of Health and Human Services; “Time Trends,” U. S. Department of Health and Human Services; additional unpublished
information provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources.
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percent of AFDC recipients in Kentucky are white
compared to 38 percent nationally.  Ninety-three
percent of Kentucky’s AFDC population receives
food stamps.  See Table 3 for additional
demographics.3
AFDC Trends in Kentucky
Figures 1 through 3 show trends from 1980 to
1995 for the number of AFDC cases, average
monthly AFDC payments, and the “need standard”
for a family of three, respectively.  An AFDC case
refers to a family unit receiving an AFDC benefit
payment.  Figure 1 reveals little change in the number
of cases from 1980 to 1988, averaging around 60,000
each year.  After 1988, however, there is a steady
increase in AFDC cases, peaking at 83,133 in 1992
and then gradually decreasing to 76,436 cases in
1995.  Figure 2 shows average monthly maintenance
payments to basic AFDC recipients during those
years.  Both nominal benefit amounts and real benefit
amounts, reported in 1994 dollars, are shown. 
Nominal and real dollar trends reflect an overall
decline in benefit payments since 1980.
Figure 3 shows the real and nominal need
standard for a family of three.  The need standard is a
monetary measure used to determine an individual’s
eligibility for AFDC and is based on the need for
food, clothing, shelter, and utilities.  It is the amount
that a state recognizes as essential for a family to
meet basic and some special needs.  Countable family
income is compared to the need standard to determine
if a family is eligible for AFDC.4  While states
currently have autonomy in determining the need
standard, the federal government does stipulate that
applicants whose income exceeds 185 percent of the
need standard are ineligible for AFDC.  The real need
standard, measured in 1994 dollar values, shows very
little change from 1980 to 1988. 
After 1988, however, there is a significant
increase in the real and nominal need standard.  In
July 1989 Kentucky implemented a higher need
standard, which made more people eligible for
AFDC, and partially explains the increase in
enrollment between 1989 and 1992.  While the
nominal need standard has remained constant at $526
since 1989, the real need standard has shown a slight
decline from 1989 to 1995 due to inflation. 
Also in 1989, Kentucky implemented a “ratable
reduction” which lowers the marginal implicit tax
rate.  This means that as AFDC recipients work, they
can retain more of their earnings.  The reduction in
the implicit marginal tax rate allowed more recipients
to remain on the welfare rolls with earnings which
also contributed to increasing enrollments from 1989
to 1992.  Prior to the “ratable reduction,” an AFDC
recipient’s benefit payment fell by one dollar for
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every dollar earned in the workplace and other related
benefits such as Medicaid, child care assistance, and
food stamps, declined.  By reducing the implicit
marginal tax rate, recipients lose benefits gradually,
allowing for an easier transition to work.
The Impact of Federal Welfare
Reform on Kentucky
When compared to other states, Kentucky
receives a relatively high proportion of federal
funding for its welfare programs.  The current federal
funding formula for AFDC allocations to states is
based on per capita income, which is comparatively
low for Kentucky.  Currently, 70 percent of
Kentucky’s AFDC maintenance payments are funded
by the federal government, a figure that is
significantly higher than the national average of 55
percent.5
Under HR 4, Kentucky would receive $176
million in a block grant in fiscal year 1996 (FY96) for
its AFDC, JOBS, and Emergency Assistance
programs, or $8.9 million less than the $184.9 million
expended in those programs in the state in FY95.  In
the Senate welfare reform proposal, Kentucky would
receive $188 million in a block grant for FY96,
combining AFDC, JOBS and child care grants, for
$10.7 million more than the $177.3 million the state
expended in those programs in FY95.  The increased
funding under the Senate plan is due largely to a
proposed increase in child care funds, which Senate
leaders regard as necessary given the stringent work
requirements.  However, under the Senate’s child care
block grant, Kentucky would receive $18.2 million
through a combination of the Social Services Block
Grant (SSBG) and the Child Care Development
Block Grant.  This amounts to $4.5 million less than
the $22.7 million the state spent on those programs in
FY95.6
The loss of the entitlement nature of AFDC and
other welfare programs will make it more difficult for
the state to weather economic downturns. Entitlement
programs are based on common standards of need to
determine recipients’ eligibility for benefits.  All who
meet the criteria are eligible to receive funds, causing
state and federal expenditures for entitlements to
expand during a recession and with population
growth, and decline in times of prosperity.  Although
the federal proposals do address states’ increased
needs during times of recession and population
growth through emergency assistance loans and
grants, the level of assistance is not comparable to
additional funds available through entitlements and,
for the most part, those funds are loans which must be
repaid.
Block grants, on the other hand, provide a fixed
sum of funds to states.  Current block grant proposals
base funding to states on federal spending from 1994
rather than the number of eligible recipients, as is
currently the case.  Since 1994 was not a recession
year, the funding the state would receive in the event
of a future recession might be inadequate.  In theory,
block grants give states greater flexibility in
determining how their programs are structured, but
that discretion is often lost to increased federal
regulation.  Other block grants (such as the
Community Development Block Grant) now in use by
the federal government have increased federal
regulation

the last resort of a government seeking
oversight of its funds.  And while block grants do
provide states flexibility in determining their eligible
populations, states no longer have the ability to
influence future allocations simply through an
increase in the number of eligible recipients.  In fact,
current proposals would cap federal welfare spending
for five years.  While nominal grants might be
constant over this time period, the real value of the
grant declines if inflation occurs.
With block grants as their centerpiece, the
proposed welfare reforms are designed for
unprecedented flexibility for states.  But they also
include many stipulations which may be regarded as
attempts by the federal government to regulate or set
criteria, including family caps, administrative
spending caps, maintenance of effort requirements,
work requirements, participation rates and time limits.
 In many cases, if these requirements are not met,
current proposals call for reductions in the block
grants to states.  This provision has prompted
officials in many states to consider this penalty a less
costly option when compared to the real costs of
employing an AFDC recipient.  Some policy makers
claim that the two-year deadline for transferring
recipients from welfare to work will cost states more
in the end as they attempt to create jobs which do not
currently exist.
Previous Attempts at Welfare Reform
Although the congressional proposals have
attracted much attention, welfare reform is not new. 
Numerous attempts have been made to reform welfare
at the state and federal level.  To help move more
welfare recipients into work, Congress passed “The
Family Support Act” (Public Law 100-485) in 1988
to curb work disincentives associated with AFDC and
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ease the transition from welfare to work by allowing
recipients to maintain medical and/or child care
benefits when they enter the workforce. 
This act also created the Jobs Opportunity and
Basic Skills JOBS program, which provides
education, job skills training, job readiness training,
and job development and placement.  Child care and
transportation are also offered as supportive services
through the JOBS program. 
The Family Support Act increased the number of
items that can be counted as “disregards” when
determining an applicant’s eligibility.  A disregard is
an expense that a family might incur, such as child
care or work-related expenses.  A family can deduct a
disregard from the countable income figure that
determines eligibility for AFDC.
Ensuring that states take the initiative in moving
individuals off welfare, the Family Support Act
requires that 20 percent of all eligible AFDC
recipients participate in a state’s JOBS program by
1995.  The law also requires that 50 percent of
families eligible for the AFDC-Unemployed Parent
(AFDC-UP) program participate in JOBS by 1995.
Most AFDC cases fall into two categories: Basic
AFDC for single parent families and AFDC-UP for
two-parent families whose primary wage earner is
unemployed.  Table 4 shows that 89 percent of
Kentucky’s AFDC cases rely on Basic AFDC
assistance while 11 percent are funded through the
AFDC-UP program.
Kentucky has already surpassed JOBS
participation requirements established under the
Family Support Act.  As noted in Table 4, 100
percent of Kentucky’s AFDC-UP recipients
participate in the JOBS program

50 percentage
points higher than the federal requirement.  Of
Kentucky’s Basic AFDC recipients, 28 percent
participate in JOBS

eight percentage points higher
than the federal requirement.  Ninety-two of
Kentucky’s 120 counties participate in the JOBS
program.  For Kentucky’s JOBS participants, 43
percent receive some sort of child care subsidy and
34 percent receive work-related transportation
assistance.  In 1994, JOBS participants were involved
in related programs at the following rates: six percent
in literacy, 20 percent in adult basic education, 16
percent in GED programs, 3 percent in high school,
22 percent in college, 13 percent in job skills training,
3 percent in job readiness, and 16 percent in
Community Work Experience Program (CWEP).7
States have also reformed welfare in the 1980s
and 1990s using federal waivers, which allow states
to pursue their own welfare reforms within certain
bounds.  To receive a federal waiver, states must
propose a demonstration project that includes an
experiment and control group.8  The primary
components of the projects in states with approved
waivers include time restrictions for receipt of AFDC
benefits; provision of transitional benefits, such as
child care, transportation and medical coverage, as
individuals move from welfare to work; and “fill-the-
gap” programs which limit reductions in benefits for
every dollar earned.  In New Jersey, for example, the
legislature initiated a “family cap” by imposing a ban
on additional aid to women who have children while
receiving AFDC.  Wisconsin, recognized for its
sweeping reforms through the “Work Not Welfare”
project, is instituting time limits and will abolish its
AFDC program by 1999.  Since demonstration
programs such as these are relatively new, there is
little conclusive evidence on their effectiveness.
While Kentucky has not applied for a welfare
waiver, the state has made numerous innovations in
its welfare program within the limits of current
federal law.  In 1989, Kentucky raised its need
standard and created the “ratable reduction” to lessen
work disincentives.  Raising the need standard makes
more individuals eligible for AFDC and allows them
to earn more income before benefits are reduced. 
The “ratable reduction” allows an AFDC recipient to
work without losing benefits in proportion to an
increase in their earned income. This lowers the
implicit marginal tax  rates associated with returning
to work so that employment will truly pay more than
welfare.9 Kentucky’s implicit marginal tax rate for
AFDC recipients is approximately 55 percent. 
“Ratable reduction” also ensures that Medicaid
benefits are not immediately forfeited upon
TABLE 4
AFDC/JOBS Related Programs in Kentucky
Of all AFDC recipients 89.1 % participate in the Basic Program and 10.9% participate in the Unemployed Parents Program
27.5 % of Basic AFDC recipients participate in the JOBS Program
100 % of Unemployed Parent AFDC recipients participate in the JOBS Program
Average Monthly Benefit payment for a family in the unemployed parent program is $253.87
% of JOBS participants receiving JOBS-supportive
child care subsidies
42.6 % Average monthly child care payment for JOBS
participants
$254.87
% of JOBS participants receiving JOBS-supportive
service transportation
34.3 % Average Monthly Transportation Payment for JOBS
participants
$52.16
Source:  Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources, October 1995.
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employment.  Since Kentucky’s average benefit
payment is lower than the need standard, the state
also allows recipients to earn enough money to “fill
the gap” between their AFDC payment and the need
standard before benefit reductions occur.  This
program, often called “Fill the Gap,” had only been
implemented in ten states as of 1994.1011 
The majority of Kentucky’s remaining welfare
reforms deal with the provision of child care to
working parents.  Parents most often cite the lack of
affordable child care as a reason for not working. 
Kentucky has created three different programs to
address this concern: 1) Direct Child Care Payments,
2) Bridge-the-Gap, and 3) Transitional Child Care
(TCC). 
The Direct Child Care Payment program began
November 1, 1995.  Prior to this time, many AFDC
recipients paid for child care from their earnings, and
recipients’ income used for child care was ignored
when determining the AFDC benefit payment.  But
many AFDC parents still found it difficult to cover
their child care costs.  Through the new program, the
child care payment is made directly from the
government to the child care provider. 
For recipients just entering the workforce,
Bridge-the-Gap provides payment for child care
expenses incurred in the month when the AFDC
recipient begins employment.  This program provides
payment for the child care expenses up to the local
market rate and child care enrollment fees up to $99.
Once a recipient is taken off the AFDC roll,
Transitional Child Care funds are available for up to
12 months.
Policy Options for Kentucky
Since 1992, the number of AFDC recipients in
Kentucky has declined by approximately eight
percent and the average monthly payment has
declined by five percent.  Figures 1 through 3 indicate
the declining rolls and decreased payments although
the state increased the need standard, making more
people eligible to receive AFDC benefits.  The
Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources credits the
state’s success with JOBS and the “ratable reduction”
programs, as well as changes in child care financing,
for the declining rolls and payments.  Cabinet
officials also claim that through training and
education, AFDC recipients are more employable
while child care supplements and a restructuring of
incentives lessen work disincentives. 
Other changes, however, have occurred over the
same time period that might account for the decline in
AFDC participation.  There has been an overall
improvement in Kentucky’s economy, for example,
and unemployment has declined since 1991.11
Poverty rates in Kentucky, however, have increased
from 17.3 percent in 1990 to 20.4 percent in 1993,
which is considerably higher than the national poverty
rate for 1993 of 15.1 percent.12 Also, the population
of Kentucky increased from 1992 to 1993.  Given
these factors, reasons for the decline in participation
rates are still unclear.
While the state has enjoyed relative success with
its welfare reform experiments, both in reducing the
welfare roll and the size of the benefit payment,
federal reform proposals and funding cuts will require
the state to make additional changes.  Regardless of
the final reform package, states will have less money
to operate their cash assistance programs and will
have to meet work participation requirements or face
further penalties through reductions.  Block grants
would give states more flexibility to operate their
programs, but the proposed work participation
standards as well as population restrictions may
actually provide states with less flexibility as they
attempt to meet federal requirements.
Both the House and Senate reform proposals
would install time limitations on recipients’ AFDC
participation.  Due to proposed federal budget cuts,
Kentucky may choose to restrict further recipients’
length of stay on AFDC.  Block grants, however, do
afford the state the option of eliminating time
limitations if state officials are willing to underwrite
the cost. 
Currently in Kentucky, the average length of stay
on AFDC is 3.9 years, compared to the national
average of 3 years.  These averages, however, should
be interpreted carefully.  Table 5 shows a national
frequency distribution for the number of years that
recipients remain on AFDC.  Nationally, 16 percent
of AFDC recipients receive benefits for less than a
year.  About 30 percent of the AFDC population
receives benefits for two years or less, 30 percent are
on the rolls from four to seven years, and 30 percent
receive benefits for eight years or more.13 Although
30 percent of AFDC recipients nationally receive
benefits for less than two years, the average length of
stay is skewed upward by the recipients that remain
on AFDC for longer periods of time.
Table 5 shows estimates of the distribution of
AFDC payments among recipients based on time
spent on AFDC.  This time is not the length of spell,
but total lifetime duration on AFDC.  According to
this experiment, recipients on welfare for two years or
less receive only six percent of total payments, while
the 24 percent of the AFDC population receiving
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benefits for ten or more years receive 50 percent of
total benefit payments.  Table 5 also demonstrates
that costs can be cut drastically by limiting the length
of stay on AFDC.  Restricting AFDC participation to
eight years decreases total outlays by 17 percent; to
six years, 29 percent; to four years, 50 percent; and to
two years, 73 percent.  It is important to note that this
experiment shows cost savings as duration on AFDC
is limited, but it does not hold other factors constant
nor does it indicate the potential impact on poverty
rates or the behavior of AFDC recipients.14
Over the past few years, Kentucky has used
available training and education programs as tools to
shorten the length of time welfare recipients receive
assistance by improving their skills and making them
more employable.  In the first year of congressional
reform proposals, ten (HR 4) or 25 percent (Senate
version) of welfare recipients would have to work at
least 20 hours per week, increasing to 50 percent the
number of AFDC recipients working at least 35 hours
per week by 2002. 
Some policy makers claim this short transit from
welfare to work will reduce opportunities for training
and education, even though training and education
may be better bridges to long-term employment.  If
states seek to meet the requirements and provide
education and training, they may have to underwrite
these programs.  States with low educational
attainment levels, like Kentucky, also face special
challenges as the requirement for working welfare
recipients increases annually.  In 1990, 64.6 percent
of Kentucky’s population had a high school degree or
higher, ranking the state 49th among states in the
United States; 13.6 percent held a bachelor’s degree
or higher, ranking the state 48th nationally.15
States with regions of persistent poverty and high
unemployment also face greater barriers in reducing
welfare rolls.  Although the unemployment rate in
Kentucky has remained about five percent for several
years, the rates have steadied at more than ten percent
in many eastern Kentucky counties.  Officials will
have to consider these special challenges as they
formulate Kentucky’s response to federal reforms. 
With limited resources and stringent work
requirements, states may choose to focus the bulk of
their resources on individuals most likely to benefit
from training and education programs.
Congressional reform proposals also include
provisions that could restrict those eligible to receive
aid under the new block grants for Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families.  HR 4 would prohibit
cash aid to unmarried teen parents and their children,
although states may provide vouchers for the
purchase of commodities such as diapers and clothing
for children.  The House bill also prohibits aid to
children born to parents who are currently receiving
aid.  (The Senate version of the bill offers no federal
prohibition to aid in these circumstances but allows
states to enact such stipulations.)  These provisions
were developed to reduce the welfare rolls and limit
incentives for teen pregnancy and having additional
children on welfare.  If the final reform package is
more closely aligned to the Senate version, Kentucky
officials will have to decide whether to enact “family
caps” or prohibitions on aid to special populations,
such as teen mothers.  Currently, six percent of
AFDC recipients in Kentucky are teen mothers, and
25 percent of families have an additional child while
receiving AFDC. 
The federal proposals also place no stipulations
on states’ need standards, another tool that can be
used to limit the eligible population and reduce
expenditures.  Although Kentucky increased the need
standard in 1989 to $526 for a family of three, it is
still much lower than the national average of $688 for
a three-person family.  A significant cut in the need
TABLE 5
Time on AFDC and Distribution of Payments
Number of Years
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Distribution of Lengths of Stay 16 14 9 11 5 8 6 4 3 24
Distribution of Payments 1 5 5 8 5 9 7 5 5 50
Experiment 1: Length of stay=8 Yrs
Reduction in Payments
2
17
6 6 9 5 11 9 52
Experiment 2: Length of stay=6 yrs
Reduction in Payments
2
29
7 7 11 6 66
Experiment 3: Length of stay=4 yrs
Reduction in Payments
3
50
10 1
0
77
Experiment 4: Length of stay=2 yrs
Reduction in Payments
5
73
95
Note: All numbers are percentages.
Source: Frequency distribution for percent of the AFDC population for a given amount of time, Bane and Ellwood (1983).
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standard would result in a significant reduction in the
AFDC roll, but the savings may accompany an
increase in the state’s poverty rate, which is already
higher than the national rate.
Further options available to Kentucky include
assessing the AFDC program’s efficiency through
administrative expenses, shown in Table 6, and the
size of benefit payments.  Kentucky’s average
monthly benefit payment of $202.26 per case for
1995 is already considerably lower than the national
average of $376.47 in 1994, and Kentucky’s payment
has fallen from $224.84 in 1990.  Of the $202.26
figure for 1995, $43, or 18.9 percent, is used to cover
state and local administrative expenses.  The
percentage of total administrative expenses has risen
from 14.8 percent in 1990. In 1994, the national rate
for state administrative expenses was 14 percent of
the monthly benefit payment.16
Conclusions
In FY95, 2.6 percent of Kentucky’s budget was
allocated for AFDC.  Although this is a small portion
of the entire state budget, welfare reform proposals
indicate that the state will have even less money in
the future to serve needy children and families. 
While the state may realize some savings by trimming
administrative expenses or the benefit payment, the
current program is already considerably lean.  As
demonstrated in the House and Senate reform
proposals and the experiment of time and payment
distribution, the greatest savings will be realized in
limiting the length of time recipients can remain on
welfare.  Cutting time lowers spending.  But, the 66
percent of AFDC recipients who are children are the
least able to provide for themselves.  And, increasing
the number of people in poverty will not lower costs
over time.
Kentucky and other states must strike a balance
between reducing work disincentives in the current
program and limiting the opportunity that needy
children and families fall between the cracks. 
Investing in training and education has afforded the
state some success in reducing the welfare roll over a
short period of time.  Continued state investment in
capable and trainable individuals may offer a long
term, though more costly, solution. 
Furthermore, if welfare reforms are to endure,
the new Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
block grant should be distributed primarily as
temporary assistance.  Many families who undergo
unexpected health care expenses, divorce or
separation, or protracted unemployment often find
themselves on welfare with no place to go. 
Temporary assistance may help them “bridge the
gap” of their personal emergency to re-emerge in self-
sufficiency.  Recognizing these individuals and their
special needs may require more intensive case
management from social workers, but an initial
investment may offset the cost of long-term
dependency.  The need for temporary assistance,
however, should not blind policy makers to the
inevitable population who, through disease, disability,
or age, are unable to provide for themselves
regardless of training opportunities. 
Fewer dollars require policy makers and the
public to focus sharply on the direction of funding
streams.  Among all options available to state policy
makers, the proposed federal welfare reforms do offer
the state an opportunity to assess the path it has taken
and decide if block grants may be used as a
foundation for bold and systemic reform.
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15 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1994, U. S.
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Introduction
Private and public decision makers in Kentucky
generally agree that increases in educational
attainment

referred to by economists as growth in
human as opposed to physical or institutional
capital

are critical to achieve economic well-being. 
Furthermore, many observers believe that formal
education is becoming more important as the United
States economy enters the "information age."1 
Kentucky traditionally has lagged behind other states in
educational attainment, but in 1990 the Commonwealth
initiated profound and
far-reaching systemic
reform in K-12 education
under the Kentucky
Educational Reform Act
(KERA).  KERA has
been described as placing
Kentucky "ahead of the
pack and likely to remain
so" relative to educational reform efforts in other states.
 Indeed, decision makers in other states are looking to
Kentucky as a leader in educational reform, since no
other state has implemented as comprehensive a reform
effort.2 
Yet, within Kentucky, both the impacts and costs
of KERA remain controversial.  One controversy is that
KERA neglects educational "basics" in its attempt to
prepare students for the economy of the future. 
Another centers on "accountability," and whether or
not teachers should or can be held accountable for what
students learn.  The area of student "assessment" is also
highly controversial.  Recently, educational experts
from outside the state have described the new
assessment system (Kentucky Instructional Results
Information System) as having serious flaws.3
Despite these controversies, it is clear that
significant overall advances have been made to date
under KERA in increasing resources available for
education.  The KERA reforms have been implemented
across school districts with vastly divergent social,
demographic, and economic conditions.  To illustrate,
the share of children qualifying for free or reduced-
price school lunch benefits in 1989-90 ranged from
over 90 percent in Owsley county to less than four
percent in Anchorage, Beechwood and Fort Thomas
independent school districts.4  These district- and
county-level economic conditions affect student
achievement and the
implementation of KERA. 
If KERA succeeds, local
economic conditions may
improve in the long term. 
However, if students
become better educated
under KERA, they may also
have greater opportunities
to leave the local community for higher-paying jobs
elsewhere in Kentucky or other states.
Linkages Between Poverty
and Per Pupil Revenues
One of the most dramatic effects of KERA has
been to eliminate the relationship that historically
existed in Kentucky between personal income, poverty
rates, or property wealth and per pupil revenues
available for education.  Prior to the reform, districts
with a high proportion of students living in poverty
(measured by the proportion of the students qualifying
. . . higher KIRIS baseline scores
(in 1991-92) in a county were
associated with higher personal
income levels in 1993.
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for free or reduced-price lunches) received significantly
fewer dollars than districts with only a small proportion
of impoverished students.  Our statistical analysis
reveals that prior to KERA in 1989-90, a ten
percentage point increase in the poverty rate resulted in
a reduction of $62.80 in revenues per pupil.
With the new Support Excellence in Education in
Kentucky (SEEK) school funding formula,
implemented as part of the KERA reforms, per pupil
revenues are now higher in districts that have larger
shares of students living in poverty (Figure 1).5  Per
pupil revenues in 1993-94 were greater by $50.50 per
pupil for each ten percent increase in the 1989-90
poverty rate.  This means that students in schools with a
high percentage of impoverished students on average
receive more dollars per pupil from state and local
sources than students in low poverty districts.
KERA has had two other significant impacts on
school revenues.  First, per pupil revenues from state
and local sources increased in all districts across the
state.  And second, the inequality with which per pupil
revenues are distributed (as measured by the coefficient
of variation) has declined, largely because school
districts with higher poverty rates tended to receive
larger increases in funding from the state than districts
with lower poverty rates (Figure 1).
Linkages Between Poverty
and Education (Test Scores)
Despite the new KERA dollars received from state
and local sources, standardized test scores are still
lowest in high-poverty districts.  Figure 2 depicts
scaled6 school district test scores for four selected
years.  With the exception of the two Kentucky
Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS)
scores, the different tests are not comparable, and we
do not necessarily conclude from Figure 2 that scores
have improved over time.
Table 1 illustrates how test score averages and
standard deviations for the different tests have changed.
 The coefficient of variation, or c.v., is the ratio of the
standard deviation (a measure of variation in test scores
across districts) to the mean (the average score for all
districts) for each test score.  The c.v. has increased
over time, suggesting a relatively larger spread (or
greater inequality) in results obtained from the various
tests.  However, whether KERA was the cause of this
increase is not clear.  If this increased variability is a
consequence of KERA, then some schools were able to
take advantage of KERA funding to quickly increase
test scores, while others were not.  In this case, how do
these schools differ?
The increase in the c.v. in Table 1 should be
interpreted with caution because the averages for the
different tests vary over time and, as indicated, only the
two KIRIS scores are comparable with each other.  An
increase in variability is evident in the results for the
KIRIS scores over the two years.  The average test
score increased from 36.3 to 44.8 (by 23.4 percent)
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FIGURE 1: Relationship Between Revenues Per Pupil and
Poverty Rates, Ky. School Districts
(excludes Anchorage independent district)
TABLE 1
SCHOOL TEST SCORES OVER TIME
Test Year Average Standard
Deviation
c.v.
KEST 1985-86 60.8 4.3 7.0 %
CTBS 1988-89 51.4 4.1 8.0 %
KIRIS 1991-92 36.3 3.8 10.4 %
KIRIS 1993-94 44.8 5.0 11.2 %
KEST=Kentucky Test of Essential Skills;
CTBS=Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills;
KIRIS=Kentucky Instructional Results Information
System; c.v.=coefficient of variation (see text above).
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FIGURE 2: Relationship Between (scaled) Test Scores and
Poverty Rates, Selected Years
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between 1991-92 and 1993-94.  This increase would
reduce the c.v. because the c.v. is being divided by a
larger number (mean).  However, the standard
deviation increased by an even larger percentage (31.6
percent) so that the net effect was to increase the c.v. 
Figure 2 illustrates the greater variation in KIRIS
scores in 1993-94 relative to 1991-92.  This increased
variation is observed for districts at all poverty levels,
and especially at high poverty levels.
Preliminary estimates suggest that increases in
math scores in grade 8 between 1991-92 and 1992-93
were significantly greater in districts in which a high
proportion of adults had completed college, and they
were significantly lower in districts with a high
proportion of families living in poverty.  This was true
after controlling for 1) initial math scores in 1991-92;
2) instructional spending per pupil in 1991-92; 3)
growth in instructional spending per pupil between
1991-92 and 1992-93; 4) location of the district in
urban or rural counties; and 5) whether or not the
district was an independent school district.
Math scores increased more in independent
districts than in county school districts, and the
difference between the two kinds of districts was
statistically significant.  Also, math score increases
were smaller in urban districts than in rural districts.
Future research will reveal if these statistical
relationships have persisted in math and other tests
administered since 1992-93.
Economists and educators have advanced a
number of explanations for a negative relationship
between poverty and educational achievement.  First,
parents in families living in poverty, lacking education
themselves, may be unable to provide assistance on
homework when asked by their child(ren).  Second,
students living in poverty have fewer resources at home
(such as desk space in a quiet study environment with
good lighting, an encyclopedia, or a computer) to assist
in homework.  Third, students over the age of 16 may
also be needed to contribute to household income in
poverty-stricken homes, leaving less time to do
homework.  Finally, students living in areas with high
poverty and unemployment rates may see their net
returns to education as low or even negative.  As a
result, these students may spend less time and effort on
education.
Therefore, an important policy question in the
administration of KERA is should socioeconomic and
demographic conditions in counties be considered
when schools are rewarded or penalized for changes in
achievement score?  Schools in high-poverty districts
may find it more difficult to increase their test scores
due to community-level socioeconomic factors
detrimental to learning and beyond the control of
school administrators and teachers.
School Managerial Efficiency
School administrators face a number of decisions
involving resource allocation during the school year. 
These include choosing how to spend school dollars
obtained from local, state, and federal sources.  One
important decision is how many personnel (principals,
teachers, librarians, guidance counselors, attendance
personnel, bus drivers, and custodians) to employ,
given the expected student enrollment.  Tax dollars
have many uses besides education spending, and
taxpayers expect school administrators to allocate these
dollars wisely.
Research studies directed toward providing
guidance to school administrators and school board
members about these decisions do not always provide
the same recommendations.  Experts disagree, for
example, on the impact on student achievement of
reducing pupil/teacher ratios.  Experts also disagree on
the value of additional years of teaching experience and
the value of a graduate degree for classroom teachers. 
Yet, Kentucky districts largely base teachers' salaries
on these two factors, rather than more subjective (and
possibly costly) measures of a teacher's ability to teach
students.  Of course, to the extent that school districts
in Kentucky are successful in increasing student
achievement levels, KERA rewards districts with
additional funding, and some of these funds go into
larger salary increases for teachers.
School administrators need to be more than
financial managers; they also must provide educational
leadership and motivation for teachers and other
employees.  Different superintendents and their
immediate subordinates bring varying combinations of
ability and experience to their jobs, which will affect
school performance. In addition, superintendents may
for various reasons be constrained in the short run in
terms of their ability to respond to KERA's mandates
(such as implementing effective site-based management
processes), and factors such as parent interest and
volunteerism may also affect the management of their
schools.  Together, this mixture of factors and
uncertainty about how to optimally combine school
"inputs," such as teachers' salaries and classroom sizes,
will make it difficult, if not impossible, for
superintendents to get their pupils to attain the test
scores they could achieve in an ideal situation.  Such an
ideal situation would arise if superintendents had
perfect knowledge about optimal combinations of
personnel (numbers of teachers, assistant principals,
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librarians, guidance counselors, etc.) and other
resources that are needed to achieve the highest
possible test scores.
We call the discrepancy between tests scores
achieved under ideal circumstances and those achieved
in reality as managerial inefficiency.  We rank each
Kentucky school district by the difference between the
actual score and the score that should be ideally
attainable, given the dollars available to the district and
controlling for the economic conditions prevailing in
the county.  The larger the difference between the
actual score and the ideal score in the district, the more
managerially inefficient the district.  This measure of
inefficiency results after controlling for factors such as
existing pupil-teacher ratios in each district; teacher
salaries; per pupil spending on administration; whether
the school district is rural or urban, independent or
county; the county poverty rate; and the educational
attainment of adults in the community. 
Results for 176 Kentucky school districts ranked
according to this measure in 1991-92 and 1992-93 are
presented in Figure 3.  The inefficiency measure lies
between 0 and 1 (or 0 and 100 percent), with 1
indicating efficiency under ideal (but unrealistic)
conditions.  The horizontal axis shows the rank of each
district sorted from highest to lowest by the inefficiency
measure (details are contained in Table 2).  Scores in
Paris independent district in 1991-92 were close to
efficient

about 15 percent lower than
possible under ideal conditions, while those in
Frankfort county were about 23 percent lower.  Hence,
these two districts were operating at 85 percent and 77
percent of their maximum possible efficiency,
respectively.7  Even among districts located in the same
county, considerable differences can exist in the
ranking.  According to Figure 3, districts improved the
efficiency with which resources are managed over the
two-year period (at least in terms of math scores). 
Furthermore, our results reveal that the top-spending
district (Anchorage Independent) was not the most
managerially efficient.  A district may have a high
average student achievement score and yet be quite
inefficient, or vice versa.
In the analysis presented in Figure 3, only grades
in one subject and at one grade level were considered. 
Further, a number of factors (such as whether parents
help their children with homework, whether children
have appropriate places in the home at which to do
their homework, whether parents volunteer in the
school, and even how many hours children spend on
the school bus) beyond the control of administrators
likely affected the efficiency ranking.  Despite these
caveats, this kind of analysis is useful in identifying
school districts with problems.  In addition, districts
that are comparatively efficient could be studied in
greater depth to determine which specific
administrative practices and policies make them
efficient.  This knowledge might be helpful in assisting
inefficient districts.
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Effects of Scores on Income
How does education affect local income and
income growth over time?  While it may be too early to
quantify the impacts of KERA on personal income
growth in Kentucky, Figure 4 suggests that higher
KIRIS baseline scores (in 1991-92) in a county were
associated with higher personal income levels in 1993.8
This is largely a statistical association rather than a
cause-and-effect relationship, and caution is warranted,
at least in the short term, in suggesting that KERA will
necessarily increase personal income levels.
There are three possible explanations for the
relationship observed between scores and income in
TABLE 2
Rankings of School District According to Managerial Efficiency, Grade 8 Math Scores
Highest efficiency Lowest Efficiency
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
[97.7-95.0] [95.0-93.8] [93.7-91.8] [91.8-89.3] [89.2-68.1]
ASHLAND ADAIR CO BELL CO ALLEN CO BARBOURVILLE
BATH CO BALLARD CO BOONE CO ANCHORAGE BARREN CO
BELLEVUE BEREA BOURBON CO ANDERSON CO BEECHWOOD
BRECKINRIDGE BOYD CO BREATHITT CO AUGUSTA CAMPBELLSVIL
CALLOWAY CO BRACKEN CO BULLITT CO BARDSTOWN CARTER CO
CRITTENDEN CO BURGIN CAMPBELL CO BOWLING GREEN CLINTON CO
CUMBERLAND CO BUTLER CO CARROLL CO BOYLE CO CLOVERPORT
EMINENCE CARLISLE CO DAWSON SPGS CALDWELL CO CORBIN
FLEMING CO DANVILLE ELIZABETHTOWN CASEY CO COVINGTON
GREENUP CO DAVIESS CO ESTILL CO CAVERNA EDMONSON CO
HARLAN DAYTON FRANKLIN CO CHRISTIAN CO ERLANGER-ELS
HENRY CO FAYETTE CO HANCOCK CO CLARK CO FAIRVIEW
HICKMAN CO FLOYD CO HARDIN CO CLAY CO FULTON CO
JOHNSON CO FT THOMAS HARRISON CO E BERNSTADT GALLATIN CO
KNOTT CO FULTON HARRODSBURG ELLIOTT CO JACKSON
LEE CO GRANT CO JEFFERSON CO FRANKFORT JACKSON CO
LEWIS CO GRAVES CO LAUREL CO GARRARD CO JENKINS
MEADE CO HENDERSON CO LESLIE CO GLASGOW KNOX CO
MONTGOMERY CO HOPKINS CO LETCHER CO GRAYSON CO LAWRENCE CO
MONTICELLO JESSAMINE CO LINCOLN CO GREEN CO LIVINGSTON CO
MORGAN CO KENTON CO LUDLOW HARLAN CO MADISON CO
OWENSBORO LARUE CO MAGOFFIN CO HART CO MARSHALL CO
PADUCAH LYON CO MARTIN CO HAZARD MERCER CO
PAINTSVILLE MARION CO MASON CO LOGAN CO METCALFE CO
PARIS MCCREARY CO MAYFIELD MCCRACKEN CO MIDDLESBORO
PIKEVILLE MCLEAN CO MUHLENBERG CO MENIFEE CO NEWPORT
RACELAND NELSON CO MURRAY MONROE CO NICHOLAS CO
ROWAN CO OLDHAM CO OHIO CO POWELL CO OWEN CO
SCIENCE HILL PENDLETON CO RUSSELL PULASKI CO OWSLEY CO
SCOTT CO RUSSELL CO SHELBY CO ROCKCASTLE CO PERRY CO
SPENCER CO SIMPSON CO SOMERSET RUSSELLVILLE PIKE CO
WAYNE CO TAYLOR CO SOUTHGATE SILVER GROVE PINEVILLE
WEST POINT TRIMBLE CO TRIGG CO TODD CO PROVIDENCE
WHITLEY CO WASHINGTON CO WALTON VERONA UNION CO ROBERTSON CO
WOLFE CO WOODFORD CO WARREN CO WEBSTER CO WILLIAMSTOWN
WILLIAMSBURG
100=maximum possible efficiency; numbers in parentheses represent the efficiency range in 1992-93; CO=county school district.
Source: Authors' calculations (based on Figure 3).
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Scores, Selected Years (Aggregated to the County Level)
Local Economic Conditions and KERA
30 Center for Business and Economic Research
Figure 4.  First, higher KIRIS scores are indicative of
graduates who are better prepared to enter the
workforce and move more rapidly into higher-paying
jobs.  Second, higher scores in certain subjects, such as
mathematics, have been shown in recent research to be
associated with higher subsequent earnings.  And third,
higher scores may help attract industries into a county
that require a more highly-educated labor force and that
offer relatively higher paying jobs.  In addition, of
course, factors other than educational achievement also
determine income growth in a county.
The relationship depicted in Figure 4 is the kind of
long-term effect both taxpayers and legislators expect
from KERA.  Higher personal income levels yield
higher tax revenues to the state, perhaps making
possible further improvements in Kentucky schools. 
Previous research has shown that net social benefits to
investment in education are positive in the long term. 
Furthermore, studies have revealed that these net
benefits tend to be larger in countries or economies
which start from lower educational achievement levels,
as in Kentucky.9
Although we believe that KERA has the potential
to raise personal income in Kentucky counties over
time, an important question remains: If KERA reform
succeeds, will better-educated students be more likely
to leave impoverished areas, leaving these places in as
poor a condition as would have existed without
KERA?
Conclusions
Kentuckians generally support the concept of and
need for educational reform, but controversies persist
on specific details.  Examples include rewarding
schools for higher test scores and restraining revenue
growth in high property-wealth districts.10  If issues
such as these are resolved, public enthusiasm for
KERA and its funding may increase.
KERA is being implemented across districts with
widely diverging socioeconomic characteristics.  As a
result, it is not surprising that the linkages between
KERA reforms, test scores, and income gains are not
yet as strong as policy makers and the public might
expect.  Creating a system of common schools that
provide equal opportunity for all students as required
by the Kentucky constitution is a difficult task even in
the most favorable legislative, economic, and financial
situations.
Still, to the extent that higher incomes are
associated with greater educational attainment, and
higher educational attainment leads to still higher
personal income levels over the long term, the potential
benefits of KERA for all Kentuckians are very large. 
The principal challenge is to break the local cycle
whereby low personal income levels lead to low
educational achievement, which in turn perpetuates low
incomes.
Notes
1 See, for example, the discussion in S. J. Goetz, "Economic,
Industrial Changes Driving Demand for Workforce Training," in
Foresight, Kentucky Long Term Policy Research Center, Spring
1995: 1-4.
2 Keynote speaker remarks by Dr. Rexford Brown, Education
Commission of the States, at the conference on Education in
Kentucky: Current Results, Future Visions, sponsored by the
University of Kentucky/University of Louisville Joint Center for
the Study of Educational Policy, Lexington, Ky., February 1995: 8
(summarized by Rosetta F. Sandidge).
3 A recent illustration of the controversy surrounding KERA is
provided on the commentary page of the Lexington Herald
Leader, Sunday, November 19, 1995 (p. E2), under the title
"KERA: The debate never ends."
4 Kentucky Department of Education, Profile of Kentucky Schools,
Fiscal Year 1989-90, Office of Management Services, Frankfort,
Ky.
5 With a t-statistic of only 1.52, however, this relationship is not
statistically significant at the ten percent level.
6 The data for Figure 2 were scaled to enhance readability..
7 This efficiency measure is relative in that it only compares a
district relative to others in the same sample.  The measure cannot
be linked to an absolute, generally valid measure of efficiency. 
Also, the estimation procedure used to derive the rankings does
not allow districts to become more efficient relative to each over
time, or to “leap-frog” other districts.  Further details are presented
in S. J. Goetz and H. Luo, "Public School Frontier Production
Function Estimation with Time-Varying Inefficiency," Kentuky
Journal of Business and Economics, 13, (1994): 66-77.
8 To construct Figure 4, all scores were aggregated from the district
to the county level.  Research carried out at the level of countries
suggests that income growth rates increase as student achievement
scores rise (see D.W. Lee and T.H. Lee, "Human Capital and
Economic Growth: Test Based on the International Evaluation of
Educational Achievement," Economics Letters, 47, (1995): 219-
25.)
9 G. Psacharopoulos, "Returns to Investment in Education: A
Global Update," World Development, 22 (no. 9), (1994): 1325-43.
10 See S. J. Goetz and D. L. Debertin, “School Finance Reform,” in
Annual Summary of KERA Research, University of
Kentucky/University of Louisville Joint Center for the Study of
Educational Policy, Lexington, Ky., (Fall 1995); and S. J. Goetz,
"Finance," in Education in Kentucky: Current Results, Future
Visions, University of Kentucky/University of Louisville Joint
Center for the Study of Educational Policy, Lexington, Ky., (Feb.
1995): 42-8.
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Introduction 
Is it possible for states and metropolitan areas to
attract firms and “buy” economic growth, by offering
them incentives to locate in their regions?  An
examination of such enticements suggests that many
state and local authorities embrace this view.  For
example, consider these recent inducements: a $183.9
million incentives package offered to the New York
Mercantile Exchange to stay in New York City, a
$720 million bid to lure a professional football team
to St. Louis, a $144 million tax abatement deal
offered to General Motors to establish the Saturn
plant in Tennessee, or closer to home, a $125 million
incentives offer to attract Toyota to Kentucky.1  Some
observers of these aggressive bidding tactics have
coined the flippant, though not
inappropriate term, “chasing
smokestacks,” to describe this
behavior.
In Kentucky, spending on
incentive programs has swelled
from a total outlay of $1.85 per
person in 1985 to over $25 per
person in 1993, illustrating the
increasing importance that the
Commonwealth places on
incentive spending as sound
economic development policy.2  As the scale and
scope of incentive programs increase, two immediate
questions surface:
                                                          
We thank Dan Jacovich at the Legislative Research Commission
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us retrieve data from the Regional Economic Information System
(REIS) database.
• First, what is the efficacy of these programs?
Are they successful mechanisms in initiating the
complicated process of economic growth?  Do
they create new jobs and reduce unemployment,
or are they merely costly transfers to businesses
whose behavior would remain largely
unchanged in the absence of these programs?
• Second, what are their distributional impacts?
Do development incentives work by benefiting
new firms at the expense of established firms?
Is employment raised in targeted industries, but
decreased in others?  Are the costs imposed on
taxpayers justified by the potential returns to
them, or do the benefits of receiving incentives
accrue to
other groups?
In this paper
we explore the
answers to these
difficult questions.
We begin by
reviewing the
common arguments
that are usually
offered for and
against economic
development incentives.  We discuss some
methodological complexities in evaluating incentive
programs and provide an overview of the incentive-
oriented development policies that are currently
pursued in Kentucky.  We conclude with an
evaluation of the Industrial Revenue Bonds (IRB)
program which was initiated by the Kentucky Cabinet
for Economic Development.  This is the largest and
oldest incentive program that is currently
administered in the Commonwealth.
In Kentucky, spending on
incentive programs has swelled
from a total outlay of $1.85 per
person in 1985 to over $25 per
person in 1993 . . .
Chasing Smokestacks: An Analysis of Economic Development Incentives
32 Center for Business and Economic Research
Development Incentives and Growth
At the simplest level of analysis, and one
universally popular with politicians, spending on
economic development translates into more, better
paying jobs.  The resulting increase in employment
and wages in turn affect other sectors of the economy.
Property values and consumer spending increase,
providing greater profits to land owners and local
businesses.  Tax revenues rise with the growth in
economic activity; if these increases are greater than
the initial outlays of incentives, then those incentives
are viewed as justified.  Adherents of the incentive-
initiated approach to development would argue that
Lexington’s ranking of number six nationally in terms
of job growth between January-July 19953 indicates
the success of the incentives provided to the Toyota
plant in nearby Georgetown and other firms in the
Bluegrass area.  Also, many would argue, because
other automotive-related firms followed Toyota to the
region, the incentives provided to Toyota had an
additional, indirect influence on job growth.4  While
this analysis may seem correct, its reliance on simple
intuition projects a misleading image of extensive,
economy-wide growth that can be easily initiated by
attracting specific firms to particular areas.
Critics consider the incentive-based approach
inherently deceptive.  They contend that incentives
offered in the form of tax abatements are too small to
affect the locational decisions of firms.  Furthermore,
they argue that conventional estimates of the effects
of tax abatements ignore the costs of providing those
tax breaks; taxes on other groups will have to be
raised to maintain a desired level of public spending.
In turn, higher taxes on these other groups may
eliminate jobs in those areas.  Therefore, a complete
audit of the benefits of providing such incentives
would count not only the increase in new jobs
formed, or existing jobs retained, but also jobs lost in
other sectors of the economy that bear the costs of the
abatements.
The effects of incentive-based development
spending on job creation may also be non-existent.
The theoretical case for this argument lies in the fact
that with flexible labor markets, a stimulus in one
market caused by an increased demand for labor by
an incentive-receiving firm, will cause only a
temporary decrease in the local unemployment rate,
and a temporary upward pressure on wages.  If labor
markets are indeed flexible, then the increased local
demand for labor will be matched by a corresponding
increase in its supply.  This increased labor supply
will occur because of in-migration from other areas.
Over time therefore, the local unemployment rate will
rise and the level of wages will fall to their earlier
levels.  Only land would increase in value because its
quantity is fixed.  Land used for agriculture would be
bid away towards residential, commercial, or
industrial uses. Because most large tracts of land are
owned by persons with high incomes, the incentives
in this case would be “regressive,” in which the
benefits of those incentives are greater for higher
income groups than for lower income groups.5
The above analysis has concentrated on the
short-term effects of incentives on the local economy.
In recent years, economists have introduced the
concept of hysteresis to explain permanent changes in
the structure of the economy resulting from temporary
fluctuations.6  A hysteretic effect of incentives would
work as follows: Suppose as a result of incentives
provided to the Toyota plant in Georgetown, the
automaker chooses to expand, thereby increasing its
demand for labor.  In the short run, several
unemployed people in the Bluegrass region will find
jobs.  Even if labor markets are flexible, there will be
a lag before workers in surrounding areas (for
example, Cincinnati), can move to the Bluegrass to
apply for jobs at the Toyota plant.  Because of this
“stickiness” in the ability of labor markets to adjust
immediately, some workers in the Bluegrass would
have found jobs at the expanding Toyota plant.
These previously unemployed workers will receive
training and acquire skills as a result of their new
employment.  In the long run, the level of
unemployment in the Georgetown area may return to
its original level; however, wages may not fall to their
pre-Toyota levels because of the increased
productivity of the workforce.  A temporary shock to
the economy has resulted in a permanent change in
the level of wages.
Given the controversy in the theoretical
arguments surrounding the case for economic
development incentives, an empirical study of their
effects on labor markets, employment, and wages
would be of significance in evaluating the
effectiveness of continuing spending on such policies.
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Development Incentives in Kentucky:
An Overview
The Kentucky Cabinet for Economic
Development supports a variety of incentive
programs to attract firms to the Commonwealth.
These range from the Kentucky Industrial
Development Authority (KIDA) program, which
offers credits against state income taxes for annual
debt service costs, to the Industrial Revenue Bonds
(IRB) program, which allows the state and local
governments to issue bonds to finance manufacturing,
transportation, communication, and health care
projects.7  Kentucky’s economic development
policies are similar to those pursued in other states.
Typically, a mix of financial incentives (IRBs,
property tax abatements, direct state loans, and
subsidized land) are offered as enticements.  In recent
years, many states, including Kentucky, have begun
to pursue “New Wave” development policies which
target small businesses through applied-research
centers, entrepreneurial training programs, and small
business development centers.8  Such policies do not
provide direct money to firms; instead, they rely on
the provision of basic service infrastructure to
encourage businesses.
We are particularly interested in evaluating the
effects that incentives exert on county growth rates,
specifically on the growth rate of earnings.  We
concentrate on an evaluation of the IRB program
because it has been in effect since 1980 and is the
largest incentive program in operation.9
Data
We obtained firm-specific measures of type and
amount of incentive money received from the
Kentucky Legislative Research Commission (LRC).
Data on employment levels, wages, and earnings for
Kentucky and the United States were obtained from
the Regional Economic Information System (REIS),
which is maintained by the United States Bureau of
Economic Analysis.  REIS data is derived from
County Business Patterns and includes county-level
data for the entire United States on income, earnings,
wages, employment, and expenditures on Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Social
Security Insurance (SSI), Unemployment Insurance
(UI), and other transfer payments.  It is an extremely
rich source of data that covers the 1968-93 time
period.  We used the CPI-U as the price index in our
research.  This was obtained from the Citibank data
base.  
Evaluation
An evaluation of an incentive program can
examine the program’s effects on both earnings and
employment.  We were reluctant, however, to
evaluate the extent to which the IRB program has
contributed to job growth.  Recent research on gross
job creation and job destruction has shown that even
in years when total manufacturing employment shrank
by as much as ten percent, the gross job creation rate
was as high as seven percent.10  To put these numbers
into perspective, consider that in 1993, Kentucky had
approximately 302,000 manufacturing jobs.  Even if
21,000 jobs (seven percent) were created in any given
year, as many as 50,000 manufacturing jobs might
have been lost in the same year as part of the normal
functioning of the economy, leaving a net decrease of
30,000 jobs.  (For example, jobs may be lost due to
firms going out of business, relocating, or laying off
employees, all of which offset a perceived growth in
jobs.)  These findings suggest that it is partly wrong
to count jobs created as a result of a new firm’s
arrival as “new jobs.”  A more cautious analysis
would include the number of jobs lost during the
same time period to calculate net job growth.
Another impediment to a “job-oriented”
evaluation of development incentives lies in the
extremely small effects that they have on gross job
creation.  One estimate of the number of new jobs
created by the Toyota plant predicts an economy-
wide addition of 16,000 jobs.11  In an economy of two
million jobs, however, this figure only represents a
0.8 percent increase in employment—a figure well
within the bounds of statistical error.  Many incentive
projects that received grants had an estimated
employment of 40 jobs.  When combined with our
earlier warning about counting net, and not gross, job
creation, the problem of minuscule effects on
aggregate employment (such as the 16,000 jobs
created by Toyota representing only a 0.8 increase in
total employment) renders even the most
sophisticated statistical techniques ineffectual.
Our assessment of the IRB program’s effect on
earnings growth will proceed at two levels.  First, we
offer indirect evidence that incentive programs may
be viewed as successful.  While evidence of this
nature does not constitute a robust appraisal of the
program, it illustrates the complicated nature of
evaluation studies and helps to motivate the formal
analysis.  And second, we will use regression analysis
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to achieve a more thorough and accurate depiction of
the effectiveness of incentives.
What evidence might we view as consistent with
the hypothesis that development incentives have
indeed spurred economic growth in Kentucky?  We
begin by noting that the growth rate of real earnings
in Kentucky since 1980 has been consistently greater
than the corresponding growth in U.S. earnings.  Can
this be viewed as evidence for the success of
incentives?  Unfortunately, no.  The “convergence”
conjecture from economic theory predicts that poorer
economies will tend to grow at a higher per capita
rate than richer economies, and eventually “catch up,”
or converge with the richer economies.12  Therefore,
even in the absence of incentive spending, we should
observe Kentucky’s growth in earnings to be higher
than that of the United States.
Alternatively, we could study the share of
manufacturing jobs in Kentucky’s economy and
compare this to the national figures.  Manufacturing
jobs are usually considered by many to be the “good
jobs,” in that they typically employ skilled workers at
high wages and with good benefits.  As such,
incentives are typically oriented towards recruiting
manufacturing firms.  We also study the percentage of
total earnings that came from manufacturing for
Kentucky and the nation.  These trends are depicted
in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.  As Figure 1
illustrates, the share of manufacturing jobs in
Kentucky’s economy has remained virtually constant
since the early 1980s.  In contrast, however, in the
United States the share of manufacturing jobs has
been declining since 1987.  An examination of the
share of earnings derived from manufacturing (Figure
2) tells a similar story: Kentucky has a greater share
of total earnings from the manufacturing sector.  Can
we explain these stylized facts by citing the
coincidental increases in incentive spending?
An examination of Figure 3 might help answer
this question.  We plot earnings per worker in
manufacturing for Kentucky and the U. S. (in 1993
dollars).  The earnings for workers in Kentucky’s
manufacturing jobs have steadily declined since 1984.
We see a clear divergence between the average U. S.
and average Kentucky worker’s earnings in
manufacturing.  With the United States’ increasing
participation in the global economy, a large portion of
its manufacturing jobs have moved abroad, in
corroboration with the theory of comparative
advantage.13  As a result, while the share of
manufacturing employment has declined in the United
States, those jobs that remain are in highly specialized
areas and offer high earnings per worker.  Kentucky’s
low earnings per worker in manufacturing but
simultaneous increase in manufacturing share
suggests that a disproportionate number of low-
paying manufacturing jobs exist in the state.  Given
the relatively low level of education in Kentucky, the
increase in low-wage manufacturing jobs may have
improved the welfare of Kentuckians, but the story is
less clear cut than a quick glance at Figures 1 and 2
might suggest.
The above analysis helps to illustrate the extent
to which a study of economic incentives (or any other
complex economic phenomenon) requires the
researcher to control for changes in a variety of
explanatory variables; economic growth and incentive
spending were not correlated once changes in the
quality of jobs were taken into account.  A more
robust test of the efficacy of incentives involves the
use of “regression” analysis.  Regression analysis is a
statistical technique that allows a researcher to
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observe the extent to which an outcome variable
(earnings growth) is affected by an explanatory
variable (type of incentive, size of incentive, year of
award), while holding the effect of other explanatory
variables constant.  In the remainder of this paper, we
focus on the results of regression analysis designed to
evaluate the effects of the IRB program.
Expenditures on the IRB program are presented
in Table 1 (1994 dollars).  We present expenditures
on the IRB program in per capita terms to put the size
of this program into perspective.  The blip in 1987
represents the bond issue for the Toyota plant.
As a first step in determining whether IRB
incentives affect the growth rate of earnings, we need
to determine whether they are given to counties with
traditionally high growth rates.  If this is true, then we
might incorrectly conclude that the incentives were
the causal agents of economic growth.  To explore
this issue further, consider the following: If incentive-
receiving firms that come to Kentucky choose to
locate in high-growth areas, then we would observe a
positive relationship between the location of
incentives and growth.  This relationship, however,
would be false—the incentives are not causing the
growth; firms are simply choosing to migrate to high-
growth areas.  If we could establish that incentives do
not go to areas with a history of high growth, but are
distributed evenly across counties, then we may
proceed with our analysis.
To resolve this question, we estimated a logistic
regression model whose dependent variable measured
the incidence of an IRB incentive in a particular
county.  As explanatory variables we included three-
period lagged values of real earnings and year
dummies.  The intuition behind such a model is
simple: Can we explain the probability of a county
receiving an incentive by using the county’s growth
rate for the past three years as explanatory variables?
If our above hypothesisthat a positive relationship
exists between the location of incentives and
economic growthis false, then we should expect no
relationship between these variables.  After
estimating our model, we strongly rejected the
hypothesis that IRB incentives were going to high
growth areas; it was not possible to predict the
“location” of an incentive based on the relevant
region’s previous growth.  Significantly, this suggests
that policy makers were not simply handing out IRB
incentives to firms locating in areas that would have
expanded quickly in the absence of incentives.
For the second part of our analysis, we were
interested in discovering whether a county’s growth
rate of earnings depended on the presence of an IRB
initiative.  The appropriate controls were the levels of
Kentucky Rural Economic Development Authority
(KREDA), Kentucky Economic Development
Finance Authority (KEDFA), and IRB incentives that
a county had received in the past year and the year
before.  We also included the growth rate of
Kentucky’s earnings.  This variable was included to
capture secular increases in earnings growth that
accrued to all counties in Kentucky (we did not want
to falsely attribute earnings growth that was
Kentucky-wide to the incentives received by a
particular county).  An alternative specification also
included the growth rate of U. S. earnings in the same
period (instead of Kentucky earnings growth rates) to
control for the fraction of a county’s growth that
might be explained by movements in the Unites
States’ growth.  Finally, we estimated yet another
equation that included “dummy variables” to control
for any year-specific effects.
We estimated the above equations and found that
the presence of IRB incentives were significant in
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TABLE 1
IRB Expenditures Per Capita in Kentucky (1980-93)
Year IRB Expenditure per Capita
1980 48.37
       1981  0.00
1982  1.27
       1983  126.48
       1984  37.65
       1985   5.43
       1986   15.28                
       1987   1002.95
       1988   102.50
       1989   15.42
       1990  31.58
       1991   47.11
       1992   29.07
       1993  24.11
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explaining growth rates in each specification.14
Moreover, the increase in the growth rate appears to
have had a permanent effect on the earnings in the
county.  We found no evidence that the growth rate
subsequently declined to allow the level of earnings
to adjust back to the former level.  It appears that the
IRB incentives had a permanent impact on the
earnings of the county.
The finding that IRB incentives do increase
earnings in the long run does not imply, however, that
such expenditures are an efficient use of tax dollars.
For instance, it is possible that not offering any
development incentives while reducing taxes for all
Kentucky businesses by the amount of the incentive
expenditures saved would have a much larger impact
on development.  Unfortunately, existing data does
not allow us to make such a judgment.
Conclusions
Is it correct to conclude that incentives for
economic development work?  Several caveats must
be stated before reaching such a conclusion.  While
our results are consistent with the hypothesis that
incentives do work, they are also consistent with a
competing hypothesis: If, in the absence of
incentives, firms receiving the incentives would have
located in the same regions, and pursued the same
production-expansion paths, then we would observe
the same empirical results of their effect on growth.
In other words, if incentives do not affect a firm’s
location decision, firms will locate to a particular
region regardless of the incentive package offered.
The arrival of a large firm will probably have large
positive effects on local employment and wages.
Therefore, even in the absence of incentives, we
would observe the same patterns of long-term
hysteretic growth.15  Our analysis is further
complicated by the fact that presumably only
successful (before they locate in the state) firms
receive incentives.  As such, incentives do not cause
economic growth but instead are only correlated with
it.
To distinguish between these competing
hypotheses and conclude that incentives are solely
responsible for economic growth, we will need to
know how these counties would have grown in the
absence of economic incentives.  For example, would
Toyota have located in Scott County with no
inducements?  Unfortunately, the non-experimental
nature of economics prevents us from conducting this
test.  As in most econometric studies, we cannot
observe the necessary counterfactual and compare it
to the observed data.  We will direct much of our
future research efforts toward determining what might
substitute for our missing counterfactual.
Readers should also realize that we have not
conducted a benefit-cost analysis of pursuing an
economic policy that favors incentive spending.
Presumably, there are other options for development
policy—investing in schools, transportation, or health
care.  When a government chooses to offer a tax
abatement or a subsidized loan to lure businesses, it is
forgoing alternative investments.  The returns on
these other investments may be more or less than
those generated by incentive spending.  Therefore,
while we do find persistent effects of incentives on
growth, the cautious nature of our science precludes
us from endorsing incentives policy as an optimal
development strategy.
Notes
1 The Economist, “Corporate Welfare: Come and Get It!” 23
Sept. 1995: 21-2.
2 These numbers (in 1994 dollars) are the sum of moneys
sanctioned under all incentives schemes, and divided by
Kentucky’s population in 1983 and 1993.  In 1983, the
population of Kentucky was 3.69 million and in 1993 it was
3.79 million (Regional Economic Information System).
3 The Economist, “Where The Jobs Are,” 14 Oct. 1995: 32.
4 Ibid.
5 A “regressive” outcome is one where the (net) percentage
benefits that accrue to higher income groups exceed those that
are realized by lower income groups.
6 Hysteresis was introduced into neoclassical economics by Paul
A. Samuelson.  The term is derived from the notion of magnetic
hysteresis in physics, where certain ferromagnetic substances
exhibit permanent changes in their magnetic properties because
of temporary changes in magnetizing forces.
7 According to the Department of Financial Incentives of the
Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, Industrial
Revenue Bonds (IRBs) are issued by state and local
governments and can be used to finance manufacturing projects
and their warehousing areas, major transportation and
communication facilities, most health care facilities, and
mineral extraction and processing projects.  Bond funds may be
used to finance the total project costs, including engineering,
site preparation, land, buildings, machinery and equipment, and
bond-issuance costs.  Property financed by IRBs is exempt from
all state and local property taxes, except for a nominal state
leasehold tax of $0.015 per $100 of leasehold value (total value
of bonds retired to date).  Some local governments may
negotiate for payments in lieu of property taxes not collected on
IRB-financed projects.  Kentucky law also allows the borrower
to retain ownership of the property financed with bonds.
Property in this case is subject to full state and local property
taxes.  (Kentucky Department of Financial Incentives,
Communiqué [July 1993]).
8 For a discussion of both traditional and “New Wave”
development policies see Timothy J. Bartik, Who Benefits from
State and Local Economic Development Policies? (Kalamazoo,
Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1991).
9 Several incentives programs in Kentucky were initiated very
recently, and we are therefore unable to evaluate them.
Included in this list are the Kentucky Industrial Development
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Authority (KIDA) and the Kentucky Jobs Development
Authority (KJDA) programs, which began in 1993, and the
Kentucky Rural Economic Development Authority (KREDA)
program, which began in 1992.  The Commonwealth Small
Business Development Corporation (CSBDC) and Kentucky
Economic Development Finance Authority (KEDFA) programs
have existed since 1980, but the small size of these programs
precluded an evaluation study.
10 Steven J. Davis and John Haltiwanger, “Gross Job Creation,
Gross Job Destruction, and Employment Reallocation,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (1992): 819-63.
11 Charles F. Haywood, The Economic Significance of Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc. in Kentucky (Center for
Business and Economic Research, University of Kentucky,
1992).
12 Robert J Barro and Sala-i-Martin Xavier, Economic Growth
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995).
13 Comparative advantage is the principle which states that
individuals and countries will specialize in producing those
goods in which they are relatively, not absolutely, more
efficient.
14 All regressions were estimated in Intercooled Stata v4.0.
Unless specified otherwise, they were Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) specifications and included the 1985-1993 time period.
15 An alert reader might point out that we included the size of the
incentive in our regression, an explanatory variable that was
positive and significant in all our regressions.  Why then, as the
size of the incentive grows, ceterus paribus (holding other
things equal), will the magnitude of growth not increase as
well?  We respond by illustrating the fact that larger firms
receive larger incentives.  The positive correlation between
these two variables is not sufficient to establish a causal link
between incentives and economic growth.
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Introduction
Recently, the Wall Street Journal ranked states
as “winners” or “losers” in Social Security, based on
the difference between taxes paid into and benefits
received from Social Security.1  The two biggest
“winners,” Florida and Pennsylvania, were no
surprises, since those two states have the highest
proportions (18.6 percent and 15.8 percent,
respectively) of their populations age 65 years and
over.2  Kentucky was rated the third biggest winner,
receiving $1.9 billion
more in benefits than was
paid in taxes by residents
of the Commonwealth.
Since the proportion of
Kentucky’s population
age 65 and over is right at
the national average (12.7
percent), something other
than age must be behind
the observed result.
Social Security is an example of transfer income,
which is income reallocated between individuals,
counties, and states.  For other transfer programs,
Kentucky is also near the top among states when
ranked according to the percentage of population
receiving assistance under either the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) or the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs.  In
1992, 9.8 percent of state residents received either
AFDC or SSI, placing Kentucky fifth behind only the
District of Columbia, Mississippi, California, and
Louisiana.3  When ranked by the percentage of
households participating in the Food Stamp Program,
Kentucky ties for eighth.4  In 1993 transfer payments
comprised 19.8 percent of total personal income in
Kentucky.
Just as transfer payments vary across states,
within Kentucky there are large differences across
counties in transfer payments.  If proposed federal
reforms, such as changing funding for programs from
entitlements to block grants and transferring
administrative responsibility to the states, are
implemented, dramatic changes in the nature and
distribution of transfer payments in Kentucky may
occur.  These proposals may not only make Kentucky
a “winner” or “loser” relative to other states.
Individual counties as well may “win” or “lose”
because there is so much variation across Kentucky
counties in the proportion
of personal income that
comes from such programs
as SSI, AFDC, Food
Stamps, and Medicaid.  If
states assume more
responsibility in
administering these
programs, decision makers
in Kentucky will have
significantly more power in determining who wins
and loses, at both the individual and county level,
from transfer policies than ever before.  If Kentucky
decides to experiment with benefit levels or eligibility
requirements, then some areas of the state will gain
relative to others.
Major changes in transfer programs will affect
how transfer payment resources are reallocated at
these levels.  Our goal here is to examine how
transfer payments are distributed across counties in
Kentucky.  We find considerable variation across
counties, much of which is not attributable to
differences in the characteristics of the populations of
the counties.  If payments were based on some
common measure such as the poverty rate, then
certain counties would face sizable reductions in
payments.
Of the 21 counties with highest
per capita AFDC payments, 20
are located in either eastern or
southeastern Kentucky.
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Why Examine Differences in
Transfers across Counties?
We examine federal programs directed towards
individual households where specific eligibility and
benefit guidelines determine who will receive benefits
and how much they receive.  Since the county in
which the household resides plays no part in
determining aid, it is natural to ask why we are
interested in the distribution of transfers across
geographic regions such as counties.
One reason centers around federal proposals to
use block grants to fund transfer programs.  If this
occurs, Kentucky may have the opportunity to
allocate its funds not simply on the characteristics of
the recipients but also on characteristics of the county
of residence.  With block grants, funding is not an
entitlement and may not reflect current economic
conditions.  For example, if a state’s economy slumps
and more households qualify for food stamps, federal
funds for food stamps will not likewise increase.
Additionally, block grants remove conditions and
requirements imposed by the federal government that
determine eligibility for and the amount of transfer
payments, placing those decisions with the state.
Eligibility for and the benefits received from SSI,
AFDC, Medicaid, and Food Stamps are the same for
households living in different counties.  Yet this is not
a feature of all federal or state spending, or even all
programs addressing poverty and unemployment.
Programs such as SSI, AFDC, Medicaid, and Food
Stamps are often characterized as people-based
programs.  In other words, aid received by
households is based strictly on the characteristics of
that household and is independent of the location of
the household.5
Other programs, however, are place-based.
While participation in such programs may depend on
the characteristics of the household, only households
(or businesses) in a particular area may be included.
Households with identical characteristics, such as
income and employment status, in different locations
may not be eligible.  Perhaps the best known of these
are various employment and training programs
contained in “enterprise” or “empowerment” zones.
Under these programs an area that suffers from low
income and high unemployment is designated as an
enterprise zone.  Both individuals and businesses
become eligible for training and tax exemptions not
available to individuals and businesses in other areas.
Location determines benefits as well for other
programs such as public housing, rent control, and
public education.  With public education, high-
income households in low-income, low-spending
school districts may receive an implicit net positive
transfer.  Likewise, low-income households in high-
income, high-spending districts may receive an
implicit net negative transfer.  Even state
expenditures such as spending on higher education,
roads, and tourism that are generally not classified as
transfer programs may, in practice, have some aspects
of place-based transfers if local economic conditions
influence the allocation of these funds.  Perhaps the
best-known place-based aid in Kentucky is that
associated with the Appalachian Regional
Commission.
Given more flexibility in administering transfer
programs, Kentucky may choose to redesign transfers
to consider more explicitly the demographic and
economic characteristics of the county when setting
benefit levels and eligibility.  If that occurs, the
distribution of transfer payments at both the
individual and county levels may change
significantly.
The natural question becomes: What explains the
variation in transfers across counties?  In particular, is
this variation explained entirely by differences in the
characteristics of the county’s populationthe
poverty rate, age, income, and makeup of families?
Or, could some of the variation arise from differences
in monitoring and interpreting eligibility and benefit
standards?  The cost to Kentucky taxpayers of lax
standards and monitoring of programs such as food
stamps that are entirely financed by the federal
government is negligible.  Any increase in benefits to
Kentuckians is largely paid by residents of other
states.  With federal financing there is little incentive
for careful monitoring at the local level.  Under a
block grant scheme, however, any increase in benefits
in one county will be borne by residents of other
counties in the state.  Block grants will increase
pressure within the state to enforce standards evenly
and eliminate any transfer payment differences across
counties unrelated to population characteristics.
The final reason for considering differences in
transfer payments across counties is the indirect
impact these payments have on individuals and
businesses in the county.  As is shown below, in some
Kentucky counties transfers are a major share of
county income and thus may have significant impacts
on the level of retail and other business activity.
Changes in the distribution of payments resulting
from uniform and simplified standards could lead to
significant changes in business activity and incomes
around the state.
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Differences across Counties
in Transfer Payments
Total transfer payments consist of 1) government
payments to individuals (e.g., Social Security), 2)
medical payments (e.g., Medicare), 3) income
maintenance benefits payments (e.g., SSI, AFDC,
Food Stamps), 4) payments to non-profit institutions,
and 5) business payments to individuals.  In nominal
dollars, per capita transfer payments in Kentucky
increased from $478 in 1972 to $3,456 in 1993, a 623
percent increase.  Over the same period, per capita
personal income increased from $3,095 to $14,385, a
365 percent increase.  Figure 1 depicts the growth in
per capita personal income and transfer payments
from 1969 to 1993.  Figure 2 contains selected
components of total transfer payments, SSI, Food
Stamps, and AFDC payments.
Our interest is not in the level, but the
distribution, of transfer payments.  Figures 3 and 4
are maps that show per capita AFDC payments and
SSI payments.  Figure 3 depicts counties 50 percent
or more below the mean per capita AFDC payment,
counties between 0 and 50 percent below the mean,
counties between 0 and 50 percent above the mean,
and counties 50 percent or more above the mean.
Oldham County is farthest below the mean per capita
AFDC payment in the statenot surprising since it
ranks first in per capita personal income.  Woodford
County’s ranking near the bottom probably occurs for
the same reason, as perhaps does Boone County’s.  A
number of the low-ranking counties, including Lyon,
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Marshall, Trigg, Calloway, and Carlisle Counties, are
located in the extreme western portion of the state.
Of the 21 counties with highest per capita AFDC
payments, 20 are located in either eastern or
southeastern Kentucky.  Only Fulton County at the
extreme western end of the state is also in that group.
While many of these counties are at or near the
bottom of the per capita personal income scale, that
explanation does not apply to all eastern Kentucky
counties, including Johnson, Floyd, Perry, Martin,
and Breathitt Counties.  Their levels of per capita
personal income are fairly close to the state average.
Figure 4 depicts the same information for per
capita SSI payments.  Several of the same counties
are at the bottom of the scale, namely, Oldham,
Boone, Woodford, and Anderson Counties.  Bullitt
and Meade Counties, near Fort Knox, also rank low
in per capita SSI payments.  At the extreme other end
are Breathitt, Owsley, Clay, and Wolfe Counties.
These four geographically connected counties are all
FIGURE 4: Distribution of Per Capita SSI Payments
FIGURE 3: Distribution of Per Capita AFDC Payments
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more than 200 percent above the mean per capita SSI
payment.  Counties more than 100 percent above the
mean include McCreary, Magoffin, Bell, Jackson,
Wayne, Knox, and Elliott.
Why Do Transfer Payments
Differ Across Counties?
There are a number of reasons why transfer
payments differ across counties.  Because most
federal transfer payments are means-tested,
differences in average income and the percentage of
the county’s population living in poverty should
provide an indication of the number of households
eligible for transfers in the county.  Most transfer
programs use other conditions such as family size,
age, employment status, and whether the family is
headed by a single parent, to determine the eligibility
of and the amount of benefits received by a
household.  Differences among counties in the
unemployment rate, the percentage of households
headed by women, and the percentage of the
population above 65 or below 18 should also
influence differences in transfer payments.  We are
interested in examining whether place-based factors,
such as whether a county is urban or rural or whether
it is located in the Appalachian region, explain any of
the differences in payments.  For the transfer
programs, though, we consider where a household
lives not relevant in determining eligibility or
payments.
To evaluate the combined influence of these
economic and demographic variables on per capita
transfer payments, we have used Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression analysis.  Using this
technique, we are able to separate the impacts of each
of these economic and demographic factors on
transfer payments.  As expected, lower per capita
personal income and higher poverty rates increase
total per capita transfer payments.  A higher
unemployment rate also increases per capita transfers,
as does a greater percent of the county’s population
who are 65 or older.  While counties in the
Appalachian region have significantly higher per
capita transfer payments, there is no difference
between payments in urban and rural counties.
We used the same approach to analyze per capita
SSI, AFDC, and Food Stamp payments across
counties.  The income and age of residents, as well as
the unemployment rate and the percent of female-
headed households in a county, do not appear to have
a significant impact on SSI payments.  Counties with
higher poverty rates and those located in the
Appalachian region do have significantly higher SSI
payments.  Counties in the Appalachian region are
estimated to have $31.81 higher per capita SSI
payments than counties not located in Appalachia
with the similar population characteristics such as
income, age, and poverty rate.  This higher payment
equals 16 percent of the state SSI average of $195.20.
AFDC and Food Stamp payments in a county are
influenced by the county’s poverty rate, the percent of
its households headed by women, its unemployment
rate, and the number of its residents under the age of
18.  Unlike SSI payments, Appalachian counties are
not significantly different from other counties in the
state when it comes to AFDC and Food Stamps.
Using this regression analysis, we can estimate
the expected level of transfer payments for a county
given its residents’ income, poverty rate, percent
female-headed households, unemployment rate, and
age distribution.  We can then compare this expected
transfer payment to the actual per capita payment
received in the county.  We find a number of counties
that have either far greater or far fewer transfers per
capita than we would expect given the characteristics
of the county.  Table 1 lists the ten counties whose
TABLE 1
Differences between Actual and Expected Total Personal Transfer Payments, Per Capita
Ten Counties with Greatest Positive Difference
between Actual and Expected Per Capita Payment
Ten Counties with Greatest Negative Difference
between Actual and Expected Per Capita Payment
County Rank Difference between Actual
and Expected Transfer
Payments
County Rank Difference between Actual
and Expected Transfer
Payments
FRANKLIN 1 $794 HANCOCK 120 $-887
LETCHER 2 702 BARREN 119 -611
BREATHITT 3 662 MASON 118 -562
FLOYD 4 576 ELLIOT 117 -533
BUTLER 5 532 SCOTT 116 -528
PERRY 6 518 ALLEN 115 -524
HARDIN 7 504 SIMPSON 114 -471
RUSSELL 8 492 SHELBY 113 -449
BELL 9 481 UNION 112 -448
GREENUP 10 470 BOYLE 111 -437
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actual per capita transfers exceed the predicted
transfers by the greatest amount, and also the ten
counties whose per capita transfers are less than the
expected transfers by the greatest amount.
Our analysis obviously does not capture
everything causing differences across counties in per
capita transfer payments.  Differences between actual
and expected payments could be due to
characteristics of the county’s population that we
have not considered.  For example, if a county has a
much greater fraction of its population that is
disabled, then this could account for some of the
differences between the actual payments received in
the county and the expected payments.
Another explanation may be differences in the
monitoring and enforcement of eligibility standards
among counties.  Programs such as AFDC and Food
Stamps have complicated eligibility requirements
that, if fully enforced, require significant
documentation of income, assets, and family
composition.  Others, such as SSI, require
certification of “disability.”  If scrutiny and
enforcement of eligibility varies significantly across
countiesfor instance, if certain counties are lax in
monitoring the disabilities of SSI applicants or
whether the father in a household applying for AFDC
is indeed absentwe may expect these counties to
have much higher transfer payments.  Since these
programs are almost entirely funded by the state or
federal government, counties have little or no
incentive to enforce the eligibility requirements.
Further, for programs that are entirely federally
funded, such as SSI and Food Stamps, the state
government has little incentive to monitor.6
Actual and expected payments also may differ
because of differences in information and access to
local agencies that determine eligibility and
administer benefits.  Transfer programs have a myriad
of eligibility standards, and households can only
receive benefits if they both meet these standards and
apply to receive benefits.  Counties where
information is easier to obtain might have higher
payments for that reason.  As Table 2 indicates, the
center of state government, Franklin County, has the
greatest difference between actual and expected total
transfer payments per capita, with actual payments 27
percent higher than predicted given the characteristics
of its population.  Residents there have easier access
to information, and their higher transfer payments
indicate their use of it.
Finally, there is significant evidence that a
sizable fraction of those households eligible for
transfer programs do not apply for and receive
benefits to which they are entitled.  Studies of AFDC
and Food Stamps have found that approximately 50
percent of those eligible do not receive them.  This is
sometimes referred to as the “stigma” effect,
suggesting that eligible individuals often decline to
participate because of negative public perceptions of
welfare recipients.  Studies of participants and non-
participants find that an individual is more likely to
participate in a program if relatives or friends also
participate.  There is some evidence of a “spillover”
effect: more participation in an area leads to lower
“stigma” and even greater participation.  In Kentucky,
some “spillover” occurs, as 17 of the 20 counties with
the greatest positive difference between actual and
predicted transfer payment exceed the statewide
average per capita payment of $3,456.
The Distribution of Transfer
Payments and Welfare Reform
How transfer payments are allocated to
individuals may change radically in the near future.
TABLE 2
Difference between Actual Per Capita Transfer Payments and Per Capita Payments Based on County Poverty Rates
Ten Counties with Largest Positive Differences
between Actual and Predicted Per Capita Payments
Ten Counties with Largest Negative Differences
between Actual and Predicted Per Capita Payments
County Rank Difference between
Actual and Poverty-
Based Payment
County Rank Difference between
Actual and Poverty-
Based Payment
FRANKLIN 1 $1,796 KNOX 111 $-2,792
KENTON 2 1,157 MENIFEE 112 -2,865
JEFFERSON 3 1,129 JACKSON 113 -2,908
CAMPBELL 4 1,038 WOLFE 114 -2,918
LIVINGSTON 5 1,025 KNOTT 115 -3,031
BOYD 6 962 MCCREARY 116 -3,183
WEBSTER 7 937 MAGOFFIN 117 -3,223
MARSHALL 8 933 ELLIOTT 118 -3,378
MCCRACKEN 9 913 MORGAN 119 -3,536
WOODFORD 10 896 OWSLEY 120 -3,950
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As a consequence, the distribution of payments
among counties may also change.  If administration of
traditional federal programs such as SSI and Food
Stamps or federal-state programs such as AFDC and
Medicaid become the responsibility of state
governments, Kentucky will have the opportunity to
redesign these programs.  Funding may also change,
moving away from the traditional approaches of
being entirely federally funded (SSI and Food
Stamps) or jointly funded (AFDC and Medicaid) to a
system in which the state receives a block grant from
the federal government.  Under this approach, the
federal government would not increase its grant to a
state if the eligible population in the state increases or
if the state wants to increase the generosity of
payments.
How might a state reform its transfer policies if
granted financial and administrative independence
and responsibility?  Given the confusing and varying
eligibility requirements among programs, one avenue
for reform is consolidation and simplification of
programs and their eligibility requirements.  To see
how such an approach might affect different counties,
we consider a hypothetical reform whereby the state
allocates its funds to counties based on the county’s
poverty rate.  This departs from the current system
where payments are based in part on the marital status
and age of the household and whether the household
head is disabled or unemployed.
What impact would this change have on the
distribution of  payments among counties?  As Table
2 indicates, for some counties the impact of this
approach would be sizable.  Franklin County
residents again would stand to lose the most (i.e., its
actual payments exceed poverty-based payments by
the greatest amount.)  Residents of Jefferson County
would also face a sizable reduction in payments.  The
counties receiving the greatest increase in funds
would be counties primarily located in Eastern
Kentucky.  Owsley County would be the biggest
winner, receiving an additional $3950 per capita.
Conclusions
Transfer payments to individuals vary
significantly among counties in Kentucky.  Much of
this variation is to be expected, given the variation in
household income.  Not all, however, appears
attributable to differences in the characteristics of the
populations of the counties.  For example,
Appalachian counties receive higher payments for
SSI than comparable counties not in Appalachia.
Variation across counties may also arise from
differences in information about eligibility for
benefits and differences in enforcement of eligibility
standards.  With the federal government currently
being the major financing agent for transfer programs,
weak enforcement of standards in certain Kentucky
counties will have little impact on residents in the rest
of Kentucky.  If funding of these programs comes via
block grants to the state, however, the penalties for
lax enforcement of eligibility and benefits will be
borne entirely by Kentucky taxpayers.
Welfare reform may also bring the opportunity to
revise standards and eligibility requirements for
programs, with the real possibility of simplifying
standards and consolidating programs.  Substantial
changes in the determination of transfer payments are
likely to have significant impacts on the distribution
of payments among counties, something policy
makers may want to consider.
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incentive to monitor these programs.
The Earnings of Kentucky Workers, 1988-1994
Kentucky Annual Economic Report, 1996 47
The Earnings of Kentucky
Workers, 1988-1994
Mark C. Berger
Professor of Economics and Ashland Oil Research Fellow, Director CBER, University of Kentucky
Introduction
Differences in what people earn has always been
a topic of interest, both to policy makers and the
public at large.  Policy makers are concerned with
issues such as the level of poverty, how to attract high
wage jobs to a local area, and the average level of
wages , which provides a measure of the overall well-
being and standard of living of the population.
Individuals, on the other hand, are concerned about
how their own earnings compare to the earnings of
other workers.  In part, these comparisons motivate
individuals to make further investments in themselves
through additional
schooling or training.
In the last few years,
there has been a great deal
of discussion about the
apparent widening of the
gap between high- and low-
wage workers.  This gap
has also had an impact on
poverty rates.  Two of the
reasons for this gap appear
to be the increasing returns
to education in the United
States, and the adverse
effect of foreign competition on workers with less
education and skills.
It is likely that these nationwide changes are
occurring in Kentucky.  Such an analysis of these
changes over time, however, has not previously been
conducted for the state.  I first examine the structure
of earnings in Kentucky using data from the 1994
March Current Population Survey (CPS).  Using
these data, I determine which groups of workers have
higher and lower earnings.  Also using the 1994 CPS,
I compare the distribution of earnings in Kentucky
with that for the entire United States.  Are the patterns
in the way workers are rewarded different in
Kentucky than in the rest of the United States?  If so,
in what way do they differ?  Finally, I compare the
1994 CPS data with the 1988 CPS data to determine
changes in the structure of earnings over time.  Which
groups have gained and which groups have lost
between 1988 and 1994?
Why do Earnings Differ?
In any given year, the annual earnings of workers
differ for a number of reasons.  Most obviously, some
individuals may simply work more weeks during the
year or more hours during each week.  In addition,
there are important differences across individuals and
the types of jobs that they
hold.  Perhaps most
important is that workers
have different amounts of
skills or training, or what
economists call “human
capital.”  Workers with
larger investments in
human capital will tend to
have higher annual
earnings.  For example, we
would expect that college
graduates would earn more
than high school graduates
and that high school graduates would earn more than
high school dropouts.  Similarly, those with greater
amounts of work experience would tend to earn more
than those with little or no experience.
But, even for those with the same amount of
human capital, there can be differences in earnings
depending on the type of job.  A worker in one job
may have a large amount of equipment or computers
that allow him or her to produce more output and thus
to be more highly paid than a worker in another job.
For example, workers in manufacturing tend to be
paid more than workers in other industries because of
the larger amount of capital equipment at their
disposal.
In 1988, a person with a
bachelor’s degree earned 48.2
percent more than a person with
only a high school education.
By 1994, this difference had
increased to 60.6 percent.
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Still other reasons exist for differences in
earnings.  One group may suffer discrimination in the
labor market, for instance.  The earnings of females
may be below those of males, even holding constant
the amount of human capital and the industry of
employment.  Some of this difference may actually
reflect the exact type of job held, but some may also
reflect job discrimination.
Earnings may differ across jobs in order to
reflect differences in working conditions or other
terms of employment.  Economists call these
differences “compensating differentials.”  Thus,
workers in unsafe or unpleasant jobs tend to earn
more, while those in jobs in pleasant locations or with
greater amounts of fringe benefits may earn less in
cash compensation.
Earnings of Kentucky workers, when compared
to the earnings of workers nationally, will depend on
worker characteristics or the returns to various
characteristics.  For example, if workers in Kentucky
have lower amounts of human capital, they will tend
to earn less.  Similarly, if the returns to education or
training differ in Kentucky and the rest of the country
differ, workers in Kentucky will have different annual
earnings than workers elsewhere.
Similarly, the annual earnings of  workers will
change over time as the characteristics of workers
change or as the returns to various characteristics
change.  For example, if the returns to education
increase over time, we would expect that the gap
between those with a college degree and those with a
high school diploma would widen over time.
Average annual earnings would rise over time if the
working population had more schooling or labor
market experience.
Data and Methodology
The monthly Current Population Survey (CPS)
contains official federal government statistics on
employment and unemployment.  The survey in
March of each year is also known as the Annual
Demographic File because it contains supplemental
data on work experience, income, non-cash benefits,
and migration.  For each person aged 15 and over in
the sample, it is possible to obtain information on
their annual earnings, hours and weeks worked,
industry, and demographics such as age, race, sex,
marital status, educational attainment, and family
structure.  This March data for 1988 and 1994 is used
to estimate the earnings models in this study.
The CPS is based on the civilian non-institutional
population of the United States.  The sample is
located in 729 sample areas comprising 1,973
counties and independent cities with coverage of
every state and the District of Columbia.  In each
month, the Census Bureau designates approximately
71,000 housing units for interviews.  Of these, some
57,000 households are interviewed, representing
approximately 114,500 persons aged 15 and over and
33,500 children aged 0-14.  The sample also contains
a sizable number of observations for Kentucky with
which to analyze earnings.  For example, in March
1994, 1,736 persons living in Kentucky were
interviewed, of which 756 are used here in the
analysis of earnings.1
The estimated earnings gaps reported in this
paper are obtained using a regression analysis of
annual earnings.  Specifically, the natural logarithm
(log) of annual earnings is related statistically to a
number of variables measuring different attributes of
the worker or the job of the worker.2  The estimated
effect of each variable is then interpreted as the
additional effect on the log of annual earnings,
holding constant all other variables in the analysis.
For example, the estimated effect of having a
bachelor’s degree versus being a high school graduate
only is the additional effect on annual earnings of
four years of college, holding constant gender,
experience, and all other variables in the model.  In
this way, we can isolate the effect of each factor on
annual earnings, without the confounding influences
of the other variables.
The variables included in the model to explain
log annual earnings are gender (female-male), race
(white, black, other), marital status (married spouse
present), number of own children under age 18 in the
household, veteran status, residence in a metropolitan
area, years of potential experience (age minus years
of schooling minus six), years of potential experience
squared, log of weeks worked during the year, log of
hours worked per week, and industry (agriculture;
mining; construction; manufacturing; transportation,
communications and public utilities; wholesale trade;
retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate;
services; and public administration).  Thus, the
estimated effect of each variable in the regression
model holds constant the other variables in the model.
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Table 1 shows the sizes of the samples used in
the analysis and the average earnings in Kentucky and
the United States in 1988 and 1994.  In both years,
average annual earnings for the United States were
approximately $2,000 higher than in Kentucky.  Part
of this difference reflects the fact that Kentucky
workers have different amounts of human capital and
work different amounts of time than workers in the
rest of the country.  For example, workers in
Kentucky on average have less schooling and do not
work as much of the year as workers elsewhere.  In
the 1994 CPS sample, 12 percent of Kentucky
workers had a bachelor’s degree in Kentucky while
nationwide the number was 16 percent.  Average
weeks worked during the year in 1994 were 44.0 in
Kentucky and 44.5 overall in the United States.
These differences in part explain the lower earnings
of Kentucky workers.  The rest of the U.S.-Kentucky
difference is explained by variances in the returns to
various worker characteristics and investments in
human capital as is discussed below.
The sample for Kentucky included 745 workers
in 1988 and 756 workers in 1994.  The full United
States sample included 72,487 workers in 1988 and
68,788 in 1994.  All wage and salary workers age 16
and over with some earnings during the year were
included in the analysis.  In other words, the only
individuals excluded from the original CPS sample
were non-workers, children aged less than 16, and the
self-employed.
Earnings Differences in Kentucky in 1994
The earnings of Kentucky workers differ for a
number of reasons.  Percentage differences for
various groups of workers are shown in Figure 1 with
key differences listed in the accompanying box.  The
data show that earnings are higher for workers with
more education or experience, workers who are in
manufacturing, or who are male.
Other differences were found but not shown in
the box or in Figure 1.  As expected, those who
worked more weeks per year or more hours per week
had higher earnings; married workers had higher
earnings than single workers; blacks had lower
earnings than whites; those who lived in a
metropolitan area had higher earnings than those in
non-metropolitan areas; and workers in mining,
construction, and public administration had higher
earnings than workers in services or retail trade.  In
general, these results are consistent with the idea that
workers with more human capital earn more, workers
in industries with more capital equipment also earn
more, and female and black workers suffer some
discrimination in the labor market.  The next section
examines the structure of earnings for Kentucky in
comparison with that of the United States.
TABLE 1
Average Annual Earnings in Kentucky and the United
States from the March Current Population Survey
1988 1994
Sample
Size
Mean
Earnings
Sample
Size
Mean
Earnings
Kentucky 745 $15,170 756 $20,202
United
States
72,487 $17,520 68,788 $22,178
Note: Sample includes all wage and salary workers aged 
16 and over with some earnings during the year.
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FIGURE 1: 1994 Percentage Annual
Earnings Differences in Kentucky
EARNINGS DIFFERENCES IN KENTUCKY
In 1994 in Kentucky:
• Workers with a Bachelor’s degree earned 60.6 percent more
per year than workers with a high school diploma.
• Workers with ten years of experience earned 20.4 percent
more per year than workers with no experience.
• Workers in manufacturing earned 61.9 percent more per year
than workers in retail trade.
• Female workers earned 17.2 percent less per year than male
workers.
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A Comparison Between Kentucky and the
United States in 1994
In Figure 2, 1994 earnings differences for the
entire United States, estimated from the log earnings
regression model, are shown alongside the estimated
Kentucky earnings differences.  The key results are
summarized in the accompanying box.  The results
indicate that the returns to schooling are higher in
Kentucky than in the rest of the United States.  This
conclusion comes from the fact that the gaps between
the earnings of those with more education and those
with less education are in general greater in Kentucky
than in the rest of the United States.  For example, in
Kentucky, advanced degree holders earn 121.2
percent more than high school graduates, while for
the entire country the difference is 104.4 percent.
Similarly, high school graduates in Kentucky earn
27.7 percent more than high school dropouts while
for the rest of the country the difference is 22.7
percent.  One important reason for this difference is
the fact that there are relatively fewer college
graduates in Kentucky than in the rest of the country.
These few college graduates therefore can command
a higher premium in Kentucky.
At the same time, however, the gap between
experienced workers and those with no experience is
narrower in Kentucky than in the rest of the country.
Workers with ten years of experience earn 30.9
percent more than workers with no experience in the
United States but only 20.4 percent more in
Kentucky.  This could reflect differences in the
quality of human capital at different levels of
experience in Kentucky and the rest of the United
States.  For example, if the quality of schools is
increasing more rapidly in Kentucky than in the rest
of the country, those with no experience will more
resemble those with ten years of experience in
Kentucky than in the rest of the United States.  This
would result in a narrower earnings gap in Kentucky.
The gap in earnings between workers in
manufacturing and retail trade is greater in Kentucky
than in the rest of the country (61.9 percent vs. 40.2
percent).  This suggests that workers in
manufacturing are relatively more productive than
workers in retail trade, which perhaps reflects the
greater dispersion of capital equipment in Kentucky.
The difference in the capital equipment available to a
typical manufacturing worker and a retail trade
worker may be greater in Kentucky than in the rest of
the United States.  Therefore, the manufacturing
worker in Kentucky earns more relative to workers in
other industries (such as retail trade) than does the
typical manufacturing worker elsewhere in the
country.
Finally, the female-male gap in earnings is
slightly narrower in Kentucky than in the rest of the
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FIGURE 2: 1994 Percentage Annual Earnings Differences in Kentucky and the United States
KENTUCKY VS. THE UNITED STATES
In 1994:
• The returns to schooling were greater in Kentucky than in the
rest of the United States.
• The earnings gap between more and less experienced
workers was less in Kentucky than in the rest of the United
States.
• The earnings gap between workers in manufacturing and
retail trade was larger in Kentucky than in the rest of the
United States.
• The earnings gap between female and male workers was
slightly smaller in Kentucky than in the rest of the United
States.
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country (17.2 percent vs. 17.7 percent).  This
suggests the amount of discrimination against women
in Kentucky is not appreciably different from other
parts of the country.  The result indicates that after
holding constant education, experience, industry, and
several other characteristics, the estimated earnings
gap attributable to gender alone is similar in
Kentucky to that observed elsewhere in the country.
Changes in Earnings
Between 1988 and 1994
What changes in the structure of earnings have
occurred over time?  These changes in Kentucky
between 1988 and 1994 are examined in this section.
The key results are shown in Figure 3 and the
accompanying box.
There have been striking changes in the structure
of earnings over a relatively short period of time.  For
example, the returns to education appeared to
increase rapidly between 1988 and 1994.  In 1988, a
person with a bachelor’s degree earned 48.2 percent
more than a person with only a high school education.
By 1994, this difference had increased to 60.6
percent.  There are several possible reasons for the
increased return.  Economy-wide, it is clear that
demand has shifted toward skilled workers and away
from unskilled workers.  Some explain this shift by
emphasizing the increasing use of technology in the
workplace, such as computers.  Presumably, more
educated workers can better adapt to and use the new
technology, and thus both the demand for their
services and their earnings increase relative to less
educated workers.  Other explanations emphasize the
declining demand for less educated workers.  As
international trade grows, less skilled jobs have
moved to other countries with lower wages for
workers.  This decreases the demand for less skilled
workers in the United States and reduces their wages
relative to more skilled workers.  Both of these
factors are likely at work in Kentucky.
The earnings difference between workers with
ten years of experience and new workers fell between
1988 and 1994 from 41.2 percent to 20.4 percent.
Perhaps the type or amount of human capital of
younger workers is increasing over time, and thus the
earnings gap between them and workers with ten
years of experience is narrowing.  This could occur if
new workers are more able to accommodate the
changing technology in the workplace.  Perhaps more
important, however, is the fact that the share of
younger workers in the economy is falling over time.
Consequently, their wages get bid up and their
earnings increase relative to workers with more
experience.3  For example, McDonald’s is now
paying up to $6.50 per hour in some Lexington
locations, an indication of the wages of young
workers rising due to scarcity of their numbers in the
work force.
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CHANGES OVER TIME IN KENTUCKY
Between 1988 and 1994 in Kentucky:
• The returns to schooling increased.
• The earnings gap between more and less experienced
workers narrowed.
• The earnings gap between workers in manufacturing and
retail trade widened slightly.
• The earnings gap between female and male workers
narrowed dramatically.
FIGURE 3: 1994 and 1988 Percentage Annual Earnings Differences in Kentucky
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Those persons in manufacturing jobs continued
to see their earnings increase relative to those in retail
trade from 1988 to 1994.  Many of the new
manufacturing jobs in Kentucky during this period
were higher-paying jobs than a worker with a given
set of skills and experience could have obtained
previously.  Thus, the premium associated with
working in manufacturing relative to retail trade
increased.
The earnings gap between females and males has
been narrowing nationwide since the late 1970s and
early 1980s.  This trend continued in Kentucky from
1988 to 1994.  The difference between female and
male annual earnings, after holding constant a number
of demographic factors and industry, was 25.8
percent in 1988 and 17.2 percent in 1994.  In other
words, the difference dropped by an average of more
than a percentage point each year.  Some explanations
include a decline in workplace discrimination and an
increasing attachment to the labor force by female
workers.  Over time, women have been gathering
more experience and thus narrowing the gap in
seniority and pay with men.  At the same time,
women are entering more highly-paid occupations
that were previously held almost exclusively by men.
Conclusions
Over the last few years, differences in earnings
across the working population have changed rapidly
in Kentucky.  The return to education and the
premium paid to workers in manufacturing have both
increased while the gender gap and differences by
amount of experience have both narrowed.  There are
also interesting differences between Kentucky and the
rest of the country.  In Kentucky, the return to
education is higher, the manufacturing premium is
greater, and differences by level of experience are
narrower, while the gender gap is almost identical to
that observed in the rest of the country.
While average earnings in manufacturing appear
to have fallen over the last few years in Kentucky,4
results here suggest that after holding characteristics
such as schooling and experience constant, the
amount paid to Kentucky workers in manufacturing
relative to other industries has risen.  This suggests
that workers with given amounts of schooling and
training have benefited from the expansion of
manufacturing because they can earn more than in
other industries.  As manufacturing has expanded,
however, some of the new jobs have been taken by
workers with less skill and training, pulling down the
overall average.  Even these workers, though, are
better off than they would have been if they were not
able to obtain manufacturing jobs.
Given these changes that have been observed
over the last several years, what predictions can be
made about the future trends in the earnings of
Kentucky workers?  Ongoing changes in technology
will continue to reward those who are most able to
adapt to and use the new technology.  Thus, it is
highly likely that the returns to schooling will
increase.  If young workers are better able to take
advantage of new technology, then the gap between
experienced and less experienced workers will
continue to narrow.  It is hazardous to predict what
direction the premium for working in manufacturing
will take; it may increase or decrease.  Whatever the
magnitude, however, it is still likely that workers in
manufacturing will continue to earn a premium over
workers in other industries.  Finally, the advances of
women in the workplace are likely to continue, and
with them an ongoing reduction in the earnings gap
between female and male workers.
Notes
1 For more details about the Current Population Survey, see
United States Bureau of the Census, “Current Population
Survey, March 1992,” Technical Documentation, 92-3,
Washington, D. C., 1992.
2 The natural log of annual earnings is used in the analysis
because invariably economists have found that log earnings fit
the data better than actual earnings in the estimation of
regression equations.  Also, models of human capital
accumulation (e.g., Jacob Mincer, Schooling, Experience, and
Earnings, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974)
typically imply a natural logarithmic earnings equation.
3 For example, in our CPS samples, the percentage of Kentucky
workers with less than five years of experience fell from 19.4
percent in 1988 to 17.2 percent in 1994.
4 See Dan Black and Amitabh Chandra, “Chasing Smokestacks:
What Do Economic Incentives Do?” 1996 Kentucky Annual
Economic Report, Figure 3.
